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Presidential Obstruction of Justice 
Daniel J. Hemel* & Eric A. Posner** 
Federal obstruction of justice statutes bar anyone from 
interfering with official legal proceedings based on a “corrupt” 
motive. But what about the president of the United States? The 
president is vested with “executive power,” which includes the power 
to control federal law enforcement. A possible view is that the statutes 
do not apply to the president because if they did they would violate the 
president’s constitutional power. However, we argue that the 
obstruction of justice statutes are best interpreted to apply to the 
president, and that the president obstructs justice when his motive for 
intervening in an investigation is to further personal, pecuniary, or 
narrowly partisan interests, rather than to advance the public good. A 
brief tour of presidential scandals indicates that, without anyone 
noticing it, the law of obstruction of justice has evolved into a major 
check on presidential power. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Can a president be held criminally liable for obstruction of justice? That 
question took on new urgency in May 2017 after President Donald Trump fired 
James Comey as director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). While the 
president cited Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein’s determination that 
Comey had mishandled the investigation into Hillary Clinton’s disclosure of 
classified emails, Trump later admitted in an interview that he “was going to fire 
[Comey] regardless of the recommendation.” 1 Because Trump had also signaled 
to Comey that he was unhappy with the FBI’s investigation of former National 
Security Advisor Michael Flynn, speculation arose that Trump had fired Comey 
to punish him for failing to drop the investigation of Flynn. This in turn sparked 
allegations that Trump had committed the crime of obstruction of justice, which 
consists of interference with investigations, prosecutions, and other law 
enforcement actions with “corrupt” intent.2 
President Trump is not the first president to be accused of obstruction of 
justice. The first article of impeachment against President Richard Nixon, which 
was adopted by the House Judiciary Committee in 1974, accused him of 
obstructing the investigation into the Watergate burglary by interfering with an 
FBI investigation.3 The article also mentioned interference with the investigation 
 
 1. I Was Going to Fire Comey Anyway, Trump Tells Lester Holt in Interview (NBC News 
broadcast May 11, 2017), https://www.nbcnews.com/nightly-news/video/i-was-going-to-fire-comey-
anyway-trump-tells-lester-holt-in-interview-941538371971 [https://perma.cc/SAV6-RZJB]. 
 2. See Michael S. Schmidt, Comey Memo Says Trump Asked Him to End Flynn Investigation, 
N.Y. TIMES (May 16, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/16/us/politics/james-comey-trump-
flynn-russia-investigation.html [https://perma.cc/3WVT-QUH3]; Samuel W. Buell, Open and Shut: 
The Obstruction of Justice Case Against Trump Is Already a Slam Dunk, SLATE (July 6, 2017, 10:59 
AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2017/07/the_obstruction_of 
_justice_case_against_trump_is_already_a_slam_dunk.html [https://perma.cc/8EN9-VSTL]. 
 3. PETER W. RODINO, IMPEACHMENT OF RICHARD M. NIXON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED 
STATES, H.R. REP. NO. 93-1305, at 1–2 (1974). 
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by the Watergate special prosecutor, whose firing was ordered by Nixon.4 High-
ranking Reagan administration officials were indicted on obstruction of justice 
charges related to the Iran-Contra affair, and several of President Reagan’s 
opponents suggested that he may have committed obstruction as well (though 
those allegations were never proven).5 After President George H.W. Bush 
pardoned former Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger, who was one of the 
Reagan administration officials charged with obstruction in the Iran-Contra 
scandal, Bush was accused of obstructing the investigation into his own role in 
the scandal.6 The House impeached President Bill Clinton in 1998, based in part 
on obstruction of justice.7 The allegations against Clinton included charges that 
he had lied and withheld evidence in a civil action and lied to a grand jury.8 
Obstruction of justice controversies also entangled the George W. Bush 
administration in the wake of firings of US attorneys,9 and the onetime chief of 
staff to Vice President Dick Cheney was convicted of obstruction.10 Amazingly, 
six of the last nine presidents, or their top aides, were embroiled in obstruction 
of justice scandals. The law of obstruction of justice has evolved into a major 
check on presidential power, without anyone noticing it. 
But the claim that the president can commit such a crime faces a powerful 
objection rooted in the Constitution. Obstruction of justice laws are normally 
applied to private citizens—those who bribe jurors, hide evidence from the 
police, or lie to investigators. The president is the head of the executive branch 
and therefore also the head of federal law enforcement. He can fire the FBI 
director, the attorney general, or any other principal officer in the executive 
branch who fails to maintain his confidence. If President Trump can fire an FBI 
director merely for displeasing him, why can’t he fire an FBI director who 
pursues an investigation that the president wants shut down? 
The president’s control over law enforcement is sometimes regarded as a 
near-sacred principle in our constitutional system. In Justice Scalia’s words, 
“[g]overnmental investigation and prosecution of crimes is a quintessentially 
executive function.”11 The principle has several justifications. First, as Justice 
Scalia notes, presidential control over law enforcement limits the risk of 
 
 4. Id. at 123–24. 
 5. See, e.g., Terence Hunt, White House Ready to “Take Lumps” on Iran Arms Scandal, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 14, 1987 (quoting Democratic chairman of the House Foreign Affairs 
Committee); Evans Witt, Feminist Leader Calls for Female Leadership, ASSOCIATED PRESS, July 9, 
1987 (quoting president of the National Organization for Women). 
 6. See Robert Nida & Rebecca L. Spiro, The President as His Own Judge and Jury: A Legal 
Analysis of the Presidential Self-Pardon Power, 52 OKLA. L. REV. 197, 214–15 (1999). 
 7. H.R. Res. 611, 105th Cong. (1998). 
 8. Id. 
 9. See infra Part I.C.4. 
 10. See Carol D. Leonnig & Amy Goldstein, Libby Found Guilty in CIA Leak Case, WASH. 
POST (Mar. 7, 2007), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/03/06 
/AR2007030600648.html [https://perma.cc/5KSX-MXVR]. 
 11. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 706 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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legislative tyranny: if Congress passes bad laws, the president can weaken their 
effect by refusing to enforce them or enforcing them only in limited cases. 
Second, the president is the only individual who is electorally accountable to the 
entire country for the general operation of the national government. Given 
limited budgets, someone needs to decide on enforcement priorities, which 
means blocking some types of enforcement while authorizing others. That 
someone is, as a matter of custom and design, the president, whose synoptic 
vision and electoral accountability to the national public make him well qualified 
to perform that function. 
But the principle of presidential control comes into conflict with other 
constitutional values. The first is the idea that no person is above the law.12 Few 
would argue that the president should be able to commit a crime and then call 
off the resulting investigation. What if he murdered his valet? The second, and 
perhaps more serious, interest at stake is that a president ought not to use his 
control of law enforcement to hamper political opposition. It is obvious enough 
that it would be wrong for the president to order spurious investigations of his 
political opponents in order to harass them. But it would seem to follow that the 
president should not call off investigations of his political aides and allies (and 
of himself) in order to protect them (and himself) from legal jeopardy. If he 
could, then he or his aides could engage in criminal activity in order to harass 
their political opponents—as the Watergate burglary, a spy operation against the 
Democratic National Committee, illustrates—without fear of legal liability. 
The founders recognized this conundrum and sought to address it by 
granting Congress the impeachment power. Congress was not supposed to 
impeach a president merely because of political disagreement. Impeachment was 
supposed to be based on “Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and 
Misdemeanors”13—in Alexander Hamilton’s words, it was to “proceed 
from . . . the abuse or violation of some public trust.”14 The Senate was supposed 
to act in a “judicial” manner when it convened as a court to try impeachments. 
As such, it would develop a set of precedents that would guide impeachment 
proceedings going forward.15 
More than two-and-a-quarter centuries have elapsed without the Senate 
determining whether presidential obstruction of justice is a high crime or 
misdemeanor that might warrant removal from office. President Nixon resigned 
before he could be impeached. The Senate split 50–50 on the obstruction of 
justice charge against President Clinton. Moreover, questions of impeachability 
and indictability are distinct—obstruction by the president might be a “high 
crime or misdemeanor” in the Senate but not a punishable offense in federal 
 
 12. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 715 (1974) (rejecting the notion that “a 
President is above the law”). 
 13. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4. 
 14. THE FEDERALIST NO. 65, at 396 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
 15. Id. 
2018] PRESIDENTIAL OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE 1281 
court.16 The latter question likewise remains open: President Ford’s pardon 
preempted the possibility that Nixon might stand trial on charges of obstructing 
justice while in the White House. For his part, President Clinton agreed to a five-
year suspension of his law license and a $25,000 fine in order to avert criminal 
prosecution on obstruction and other charges.17 
In this Article,18 we argue that the crime of obstruction of justice does apply 
to the president, but it applies in a special way because of the president’s role as 
 
 16. See Lawrence H. Tribe, Defining “High Crimes and Misdemeanors”: Basic Principles, 67 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 712, 717 (1999) (“[I]t appears to be all but universally agreed that an offense need 
not be a violation of criminal law at all in order for it to be impeachable as a high crime or 
misdemeanor.”). 
 17. Opinion, Mr. Clinton’s Last Deal, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 20, 2001), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/01/20/opinion/mr-clinton-s-last-deal.html [https://perma.cc/6GN3-
Z3WA]. 
 18. This expands upon arguments we have sketched out, individually and together, in a series 
of blog posts and opinion pieces. See Eric Posner, Can the President Commit the Crime of Obstruction 
of Justice?, ERICPOSNER.COM (June 9, 2017), http://ericposner.com/can-the-president-commit-the-
crime-of-obstruction-of-justice [https://perma.cc/X92Y-CD5G] (arguing that a president can be 
criminally liable for obstruction of justice if the action taken is “corrupt”); Daniel Hemel & Eric Posner, 
Can the President Commit the Crime of Obstruction?, II, ERICPOSNER.COM (June 10, 2017), 
http://ericposner.com/can-the-president-commit-the-crime-of-obstruction-ii [https://perma.cc/S9P5-
9D79] (explaining that motive helps define those sets of actions for which the president’s enforcement 
authority may be constrained); Daniel Hemel & Eric Posner, When Does the President Commit 
Obstruction of Justice?, III, ERICPOSNER.COM (June 12, 2017), http://ericposner.com/when-does-the-
president-commit-obstruction-of-justice-iii [https://perma.cc/WTW3-5AKE] (outlining the difficulty in 
determining the reasoning behind a president’s action in mixed motive situations); Daniel Hemel & Eric 
Posner, Meta-Obstruction of Justice, ERICPOSNER.COM (June 13, 2017), http://ericposner.com/meta-
obstruction-of-justice [https://perma.cc/K64S-MJNN] (exploring whether a president could be 
criminally liable for obstructing an investigation into obstruction of justice); Daniel Hemel & Eric 
Posner, Opinion, The Case for Obstruction Charges, N.Y. TIMES (June 15, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/15/opinion/the-case-for-obstruction-charges.html 
[https://perma.cc/B3NT-MWPV] (arguing that there is a strong case Donald Trump committed 
obstruction of justice when he fired James Comey after seeking to influence his investigation into 
Michael Flynn); Daniel Hemel & Eric Posner, Opinion, If Trump Pardons, It Could Be a Crime, N.Y. 
TIMES (July 21, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/21/opinion/if-trump-pardons-crime-
russia.html [https://perma.cc/J6ST-8XSV] (arguing that if Trump pardons family members and other 
aides, he may be guilty of obstructing justice); Daniel Hemel & Eric Posner, The Obstruction of Justice 
Case Against Donald Trump, SLATE (July 27, 2017), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2017/07/trump_is_violating_federal_la
w_by_pushing_sessions_to_go_after_hillary_clinton.html [https://perma.cc/HSA2-8FU3] (arguing that 
there is a strong case Trump obstructed justice by pressuring the Justice Department to investigate 
Hillary Clinton and James Comey). We have benefitted from the writings of others who have considered 
the application of the obstruction statutes to President Trump in recent months. See, e.g., Buell, supra, 
note 2 (arguing that Trump committed criminal obstruction of justice by pressuring Comey to drop the 
Flynn investigation and firing Comey); Frank O. Bowman, Sam Buell on Obstruction, IMPEACHABLE 
OFFENSES? (July 8, 2017), https://impeachableoffenses.net/2017/07/08/sam-buell-on-obstruction 
[https://perma.cc/7PTK-9CHS] (questioning the assertion that Trump’s criminal liability for obstruction 
is a “slam dunk” and outlining the complexities of proving motive in such cases); Samuel W. Buell & 
Frank O. Bowman, Professor Buell Responds on Obstruction, IMPEACHABLE OFFENSES? (July 10, 
2017), https://impeachableoffenses.net/2017/07/10/professor-buell-responds-on-obstruction 
[https://perma.cc/2A2N-VKSG] (critiquing scholars’ views on whether Trump could be held liable for 
obstruction and concluding that more facts showing corruption make it more likely under any theory of 
presidential obstruction). 
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head of the executive branch. As defined by statute and precedent, the crime of 
obstruction occurs when an individual “corruptly” endeavors to impede or 
influence an investigation or other proceeding, and the word “corruptly” is 
understood to mean “with an improper purpose.”19 When the president impedes 
or influences an investigation with a proper purpose, he does not commit the 
crime of obstruction. The critical question, then, is when it is proper for the 
president to intervene. 
Article II of the Constitution suggests an answer to that question. It vests 
the president with “executive power,” obligates him to “take care that the laws 
be faithfully executed,”20 and gives some other roles and functions like that of 
commander in chief. When these authorities empower him to achieve certain 
goals, he is allowed to drop or block prosecutions and other enforcement actions 
that interfere with those goals. For example, if the president intervenes in an 
investigation because he thinks that national security demands it, he acts properly 
and not corruptly. Likewise, if the president decides in good faith that a particular 
investigation or class of investigations represents a poor use of scarce 
enforcement resources, he may block it (or them) without committing 
obstruction of justice.21 But if the president interferes with an investigation 
because he worries that it might bring to light criminal activity that he, his family, 
or his top aides committed—and not for reasons related to national security or 
the faithful execution of federal law—then he acts corruptly, and thus criminally. 
The Constitution does not authorize the president to employ his office for 
personal or partisan advantage, and intervening in an investigation for that 
purpose is not a proper use of presidential power. 
In Part I, we provide background on the crime of obstruction of justice and 
on the president’s authority over law enforcement. We propose a test for 
presidential obstruction of justice that balances competing constitutional values 
in a workable way. While the application of the obstruction statutes to the 
president raises a number of novel legal questions, courts considering these 
questions have several sources from which to draw. First, specific constitutional 
provisions support a broader structural inference that a president abuses his 
power when he uses his office to pursue personal, pecuniary, and narrowly 
partisan objectives. Second, ethical and legal guidelines that control lower-level 
law enforcement officials buttress the notion that prosecutorial discretion does 
not allow one to wield law enforcement power for personal, pecuniary, and 
partisan ends. While the application of the obstruction statutes to the president 
presents questions that are in some sense sui generis, these questions are in other 
 
 19. See 18 U.S.C. § 1515(b) (2018). 
 20. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 5. 
 21. We take no position on whether the Take Care Clause or any other provision forbids the 
president from refusing to enforce statutes for good faith policy reasons; in any event, we do not believe 
that such action could count as “obstruction of justice.” We discuss this issue in Part I.B. 
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respects analogous to the challenges addressed elsewhere in the Constitution, 
and to challenges that federal prosecutors routinely face. 
In Part II, we address a range of complications and counterarguments. First, 
we address the problem of mixed motives. Does a president obstruct justice if he 
stops an investigation for both personal reasons and reasons of the public 
interest? We argue that he does if the personal reason is a but-for cause of the 
action. Second, we consider the argument that a crime of presidential obstruction 
of justice is inconsistent with the pardon power. According to this argument, 
since the president may pardon someone before that person has been convicted 
of a crime, and such a pardon could halt an investigation, the president cannot 
coherently be found criminally liable for obstructing justice. We reject this 
argument. Even if the pardon power is plenary (and we note several objections 
to that view), halting an investigation and pardoning a person are different 
actions, with different political costs, so there is no inconsistency between 
criminalizing obstruction of justice and allowing pardons. Further, we argue that 
if a president pardons someone in order to obstruct justice, the president may be 
guilty of a crime even if the pardon itself is valid in the sense that it releases the 
pardoned person from criminal liability. 
Third, we briefly address the argument that all talk of presidential 
obstruction of justice is idle because the president cannot be convicted of a crime 
while in office. The problem with this view is that impeachment is at least partly 
based on criminal activity, so it may matter whether obstruction of justice is a 
crime. Moreover, it is possible that the president can be convicted of a crime 
while in office; and even if he cannot, he can be convicted after he leaves office 
of a crime that he committed while in office. 
Finally, we discuss and reject the argument that the canon of constitutional 
avoidance—the principle that statutory ambiguities should be resolved in a way 
that avoids difficult constitutional questions—cuts against applying the 
obstruction of justice statutes to the president. The avoidance canon applies only 
in cases of ambiguity, and there is nothing in the text or the legislative history of 
the obstruction statutes that suggests the president might be excluded. 
I. 
ANALYSIS 
A. Obstruction of Justice 
Obstruction of justice is an offense with roots in the nation’s founding. The 
Declaration of Independence charged King George III with “obstruct[ing] the 
Administration of Justice, by refusing his Assent to Laws for establishing 
Judiciary powers.”22 George interfered with the establishment of courts, not with 
particular investigations, but the principle is the same. While we will not belabor 
 
 22. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 10 (U.S. 1776). 
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this point, we note that if the king could commit obstruction of justice, surely the 
president, whose executive power is more limited, can as well. 
The first federal obstruction statute, which dates from 1831,23 provided for 
the punishment of “any person or persons” who “corruptly, or by threats or force, 
obstruct, or impede, or endeavour to obstruct or impede, the due administration 
of justice” in “any court of the United States.”24 This original obstruction statute 
has survived with relatively minor modifications and is now codified as section 
1503 of title 18.25 
Since the 19th century, Congress has added several more obstruction 
statutes to the criminal code.26 While the various statutes differ in their scope, all 
share three basic elements. First, they all contain a similar actus reus 
requirement: the defendant must influence, obstruct, or impede the due 
administration of justice, or endeavor to do the same. Second, they include the 
same mens rea requirement: the defendant must act “corruptly.” Third, they all 
include a scope limitation: corruptly obstructing the administration of justice in 
the abstract is not enough for criminal liability. The obstruction must affect some 
sort of proceeding. 
1. Actus Reus 
To be guilty of obstruction under federal law, a person must satisfy the 
crime’s actus reus requirement: he must—or must endeavor to—influence, 
 
 23. Act of Mar. 2, 1831, ch. 99, § 2, 4 Stat. 487. Prior to this, the crime of obstruction was not 
sharply distinguished from contempt of court. See Note, Criminal Venue in the Federal Courts: The 
Obstruction of Justice Puzzle, 82 MICH. L. REV. 90, 97 (1983). The 1831 law limited contempt to cases 
involving misbehavior in or near federal courts, misbehavior by court officers, and disobedience of court 
orders. Act of Mar. 2, 1831, ch. 99, § 1, 4 Stat. at 487–88. Obstruction applied to misdeeds that occurred 
farther afield. 
 24. Act of Mar. 2, 1831, ch. 99, § 2, 4 Stat. at 488. 
 25. Section 1503(a) provides (in relevant part) that “[w]hoever . . . corruptly or by threats or 
force, or by any threatening letter or communication, influences, obstructs, or impedes, or endeavors to 
influence, obstruct, or impede, the due administration of justice, shall be punished . . . .” 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1503(a) (2018). 
 26. In addition to section 1503, two more obstruction statutes are particularly relevant to 
presidential conduct. Section 1505, added in 1940, provides (in relevant part) that: 
Whoever corruptly, or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or communication 
influences, obstructs, or impedes or endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede the due and 
proper administration of the law under which any pending proceeding is being had before 
any department or agency of the United States, or the due and proper exercise of the power 
of inquiry under which any inquiry or investigation is being had by either House, or any 
committee of either House or any joint committee of the Congress . . . [s]hall be fined . . . , 
imprisoned . . . , or both. 
18 U.S.C. § 1505 (2018); see Act of Jan. 13, 1940, ch. 1, § 135(a), 54 Stat. 13 (1940). Section 1512(c), 
added in 2002, provides (in relevant part) that: 
Whoever corruptly . . . obstructs, influences, or impedes any official proceeding, or attempts 
to do so, shall be fined . . . or imprisoned . . . or both. 
18 U.S.C. § 1512(c) (2018); see Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 1102, 116 Stat. 
745, 806. 
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obstruct, or impede a covered proceeding.27 In the run-of-the-mill obstruction 
case, the defendant is charged with altering, concealing, or destroying 
subpoenaed documents, or with encouraging or giving false testimony,28 but 
courts have applied the obstruction statutes to a range of other activities as well.29 
In one case, a witness was convicted of obstruction after he claimed memory loss 
134 times in a 90-minute Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
deposition.30 In another case, a defendant was convicted of obstruction for 
obtaining grand jury transcripts from a typist who worked for a court reporter 
service and then sharing them with the target of the grand jury probe.31 In still 
another case, a criminal defense lawyer was convicted of obstruction after filing 
a flood of motions in state and federal court knowing that they contained an 
inaccurate rendition of events.32 
The actus reus requirement does not require that an obstruction conviction 
be predicated on a single act. A “continuing course of conduct” that obstructs an 
investigation can be the basis for guilt.33 And as the use of the verbs “endeavor” 
and “attempt” in the obstruction statutes suggests, a defendant can be convicted 
of obstruction even if his effort to stymie an investigation does not succeed. 
Moreover, a defendant who is innocent of the underlying charge can be convicted 
of obstructing the investigation into that charge.34 Obstruction of justice is an 
independent crime. 
But of course, it cannot be the case that any action or course of conduct that 
might interfere with an investigation of any charge constitutes criminal 
obstruction. The criminal defense lawyer who moves to quash a subpoena 
thereby impedes an investigation, but that does not mean that he should go to 
jail. What “separates the wheat from the chaff” in obstruction cases is the mens 
rea requirement: to be guilty of obstruction, a defendant must act with a “corrupt 
purpose.”35 
 
 27. See 18 U.S.C. § 1503(a) (“influences, obstructs, or impedes, or endeavors to influence, 
obstruct, or impede, the due administration of justice”); § 1505 (“influences, obstructs, or impedes or 
endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede the due and proper administration of the law”); § 1512(c)(2) 
(“obstructs, influences, or impedes . . . , or attempts to do so”). 
 28. See Matthew Harrington & Benjamin Schiffelbein, Obstruction of Justice, 51 AM. CRIM. L. 
REV. 1477, 1488–90 (2014). 
 29. See, e.g., United States v. Silverman, 745 F.2d 1386, 1393 (11th Cir. 1984) (Section 1503 
“reaches all corrupt conduct capable of producing [an] effect that prevents justice from being duly 
administered, regardless of the means employed.”). 
 30. United States v. Alo, 439 F.2d 751, 752–54 (2d Cir. 1971) (A witness’s “blatantly evasive” 
testimony can qualify as obstruction even though it might not rise to level of perjury.). 
 31. United States v. Jeter, 775 F.2d 670, 672–73, 675–79 (6th Cir. 1985). 
 32. United States v. Cueto, 151 F.3d 620, 628–35 (7th Cir. 1998). 
 33. See United States v. North, 910 F.2d 843, 877 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
 34. See United States v. Hopper, 177 F.3d 824, 831 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that individuals 
charged with obstructing an IRS proceeding could not defend themselves on the ground that the 
underlying tax levy was invalid). 
 35. See United States v. Cintolo, 818 F.2d 980, 995 (1st Cir. 1987) (“When all is said and done, 
what separates the wheat from the chaff in this case is the plentitude of evidence developed at trial from 
which the jury could have concluded that [the defendant acted] with corrupt purpose . . . .”). 
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2. Mens Rea 
What exactly does it mean for a defendant to act with a “corrupt purpose,” 
and thus to meet the mens rea requirement for obstruction?36 Four possible 
interpretations emerge from the case law, of which the fourth—that “corruptly” 
means with “an improper purpose”—is the most widely accepted. 
One view is that a defendant acts “corruptly” whenever he specifically 
seeks to interfere with a proceeding.37 On this view, “the word ‘corruptly’ means 
nothing more than an intent to obstruct the proceeding.”38 But this view goes too 
far by interfering with accepted elements of the adversary proceeding. Everyone 
agrees that the defense lawyer who knows his client is guilty but gives a rousing 
closing statement that leads to the client’s acquittal does not commit obstruction, 
even though he endeavors to influence the due administration of justice. The 
problems with this view are even more acute in the context of section 1505, 
which applies to endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede administrative and 
congressional proceedings. Minority party lawmakers, executive branch 
officials, and political activists all seek to influence congressional inquiries. One 
does not commit obstruction of justice simply by participating in the hurly burly 
of interest group politics.39 
A second view is that the term “corruptly” does not refer to mens rea but 
instead to the means by which a defendant obstructs justice. If the defendant acts 
illegally in the course of obstructing the due administration of justice, then his 
conduct falls within the ambit of the obstruction statute. Judge Laurence 
Silberman pointed out the virtues of this view in a dissenting opinion in the case 
of Oliver North, a Reagan administration official convicted of obstructing 
Congress’s investigation into the Iran-Contra affair: 
If the jury focuses on the means chosen by the defendant in his endeavor 
to obstruct, it would not necessarily need to probe the morality or 
propriety of the defendant’s purpose—something the criminal law 
ordinarily eschews . . . . [T]he “means” view does seem to mitigate that 
problem since, for example, a defendant who bribes the chairman of a 
congressional committee can be said to have acted “corruptly” no matter 
how laudable his underlying motive.40 
 
 36. Sections 1503 and 1505 also make it a crime to obstruct justice “by threats or force, or by 
any threatening letter or communication.” See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1503(a), 1505 (2018). Our focus here is on 
harder cases in which the threat and force prongs of the obstruction statutes do not apply. 
 37. See, e.g., United States v. Rasheed, 663 F.2d 843, 852 (9th Cir. 1981) (construing 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1503(a) to require an act “done with the purpose of obstructing justice”). 
 38. See United States v. North, 910 F.2d 843, 882 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (summarizing case law from 
other circuits without adopting this view). 
 39. See id. (“No one can seriously question that people constantly attempt, in innumerable ways, 
to obstruct or impede congressional committees . . . . but it does not necessarily follow that [they do] so 
corruptly.”). 
 40. Id. at 943 (Silberman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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One possible objection to this means-based view is that it renders the 
obstruction of justice statutes redundant with other statutes, so that obstruction 
serves as no more than a sentencing enhancement. If “corruptly” requires that 
the defendant’s act be independently unlawful, then the obstruction statutes 
merely enhance the penalties for an act that the criminal law already proscribes. 
In any event, as we shall soon see, Congress has decisively rejected the means-
based view. 
A third view comes from the D.C. Circuit’s opinion in the case of John 
Poindexter, who served as national security advisor to President Reagan and 
who—like North—was later charged with and convicted of obstruction in 
connection with the Iran-Contra scandal. The majority opinion in the Poindexter 
case suggested that the term “corruptly” in section 1505 should be read 
“transitively”: a defendant “corruptly” obstructs a proceeding when he interferes 
with the proceeding “by means of corrupting another.”41 More specifically, the 
majority suggested that the statute should “include only ‘corrupting’ another 
person by influencing him to violate his legal duty.”42 But courts had long 
construed the obstruction statutes to apply to defendants whose solo actions 
interfered with a proceeding.43 Moreover, it is a puzzle why Congress would 
have wanted to punish defendants who encourage others to violate their legal 
duties but not to punish defendants who violate their own legal duties.44 
Congress decisively rejected the D.C. Circuit’s “transitive” interpretation. 
The False Statements Accountability Act of 1996, which abrogated the 
Poindexter ruling,45 provides that “[a]s used in section 1505, the term ‘corruptly’ 
means acting with an improper purpose, personally or by influencing another, 
including making a false or misleading statement, or withholding, concealing, 
altering, or destroying a document or other information.”46 And while the 1996 
law on its face applies only to section 1505, the legislative history suggests that 
Congress intended to align the construction of “corruptly” in section 1505 with 
the interpretation of that term in the other obstruction statutes.47 Senator Levin, 
one of the bill’s sponsors, said that the bill would “bring [section 1505] back into 
 
 41. United States v. Poindexter, 951 F.2d 369, 379 (D.C. Cir. 1991). 
 42. Id. at 379. 
 43. See, e.g., United States v. Lavelle, 751 F.2d 1266 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (submitting false 
statement to congressional committee); United States v. Vixie, 532 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1976) 
(submitting false documents in response to IRS subpoena); United States v. Alo, 439 F.2d 751 (2d Cir. 
1971) (giving evasive testimony). 
 44. See Poindexter, 951 F.2d at 390–91 (Mikva, J., dissenting in part) (noting the strange result 
of the majority’s transitive interpretation). 
 45. False Statements Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-292, § 3, 110 Stat. 3459 
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1515(b) (2018)); see United States v. Hassoun, 477 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1226–27 
(S.D. Fla. 2007) (noting that “Poindexter’s holding ha[s] been overturned by Congress’ enactment of 18 
U.S.C. § 1515(b)”). 
 46. 18 U.S.C. § 1515(b). 
 47. Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (2018) (obstruction of grand jury or court proceeding); 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1512(b) (2018) (obstruction of “official proceeding” by persuading or misleading another person). 
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line with other obstruction statutes protecting government inquiries.”48 And 
indeed, several other courts had previously interpreted the term “corruptly” in 
other obstruction statutes to mean just that: motivated by an “improper 
purpose.”49 
This fourth view—that “corruptly” means motivated by an “improper 
purpose”—is now the near-consensus view among the courts of appeals.50 Yet 
agreeing that “corruptly” refers to “improper purpose” still leaves the question 
of which purposes are “proper.” The answer depends on the actor’s role. The 
prosecutor who intervenes in an investigation because he thinks it represents a 
misallocation of law enforcement resources acts with a proper purpose. In 
general, prosecutors have broad discretion to bring or drop cases based on a 
range of logistical and administrative reasons, and any such decision made in 
good faith is not improper. In contrast, ordinary citizens are not vested with this 
discretion. The citizen activist who obstructs an investigation because he thinks 
it represents a misallocation of law enforcement resources might well be 
criminally liable. 
The role-based nature of the mens rea inquiry does not imply that 
prosecutors enjoy absolute immunity from obstruction charges. Consider the 
case of former Pennsylvania Attorney General Kathleen Kane, who clashed 
repeatedly with a Philadelphia prosecutor, Frank Fina.51 While she was attorney 
general, Kane allegedly leaked secret grand jury documents to a Philadelphia 
newspaper implying that Fina had bungled a probe of a Philadelphia civil rights 
 
 48. False Statements After the Hubbard v. United States Decision: Hearing on S. 1734 Before 
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong., 2d sess., at 5 (May 14, 1996). 
 49. See, e.g., United States v. Fasolino, 586 F.2d 939, 941 (2d Cir. 1978) (construing § 1503 to 
require acting corruptly by having an improper purpose); United States v. Partin, 552 F.2d 621, 642 (5th 
Cir. 1977) (“[T]he word ‘corruptly’ in § 1503 means a defendant acted with improper motive or with 
bad or evil or wicked purpose” (some internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Haldeman, 
559 F.2d 31, 115 n.229 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (quoting jury instructions stating that “[t]he word, ‘corruptly’,  
as used in [section 1503] simply means having an evil or improper purpose or intent”). 
 50. See United States v. Gordon, 710 F.3d 1124, 1151 (10th Cir. 2013) (“Acting ‘corruptly’ 
within the meaning of § 1512(c)(2) means acting with an improper purpose and to engage in conduct 
knowingly and dishonestly with the specific intent to subvert, impede or obstruct . . . .”) (internal 
quotation marks omitted); United States v. Mintmire, 507 F.3d 1273, 1289 (11th Cir. 2007) (“corruptly” 
as used in section 1512(c)(2) means “with an improper purpose and to engage in conduct knowingly 
and dishonestly with the specific intent to subvert, impede or obstruct” an official proceeding); United 
States v. Arthur Andersen LLP, 374 F.3d 281, 296 (5th Cir. 2004) (“Under the caselaw, ‘corruptly’ 
requires an improper purpose”) (emphasis in original), rev’d and remanded on other grounds, 544 U.S. 
696 (2005); United States v. Thompson, 76 F.3d 442, 452 (2d Cir. 1996) (noting that “we have 
interpreted the term ‘corruptly,’ as it appears in § 1503, to mean motivated by an improper purpose,” 
and extending that interpretation to section 1512(b)); Brown v. United States, 89 A.3d 98, 104 (D.C. 
2014) (“individuals act ‘corruptly’ when they are ‘motivated by an improper purpose’”); see also Arthur 
Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 705 (2005) (in construing section 1512(b), noting that 
“‘Corrupt’ and ‘corruptly’ are normally associated with wrongful, immoral, depraved, or evil” acts). 
 51. See Charles Thompson, In Kathleen Kane v. Frank Fina, Bad Blood, Porn and Leaks Make 
for Mutually Assured Destruction, PENNLIVE (Aug. 26, 2015), 
http://www.pennlive.com/midstate/index.ssf/2015/08/post_787.html [https://perma.cc/79HW-
KQVW]. 
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leader.52 When her subordinates suggested that the Attorney General’s Office 
should look into the leak, Kane reportedly told her staff not to investigate the 
matter and also asked one of her subordinates to take action to shut down a grand 
jury probe into the leak.53 On the basis of this evidence, Kane was indicted for 
obstruction of justice under Pennsylvania law.54 She was ultimately convicted of 
obstruction as well as other charges.55 
The Kane case suggests that a prosecutor who abuses her position to tar a 
political rival and then tries to shut down any inquiry into the matter thereby 
commits obstruction of justice. But what of a district attorney who drops an 
investigation of a popular celebrity because of a possible adverse public reaction 
that would harm his chances of reelection?56 Would it change matters if the 
district attorney’s decision was not political, but resulted from his personal 
affection for the celebrity stemming from the celebrity’s role in a long-ago 
television show? Case law provides little guidance. The Pandora’s box of 
hypotheticals does not mean, however, that prosecutors who abuse their power 
for personal, pecuniary, or partisan ends get off scot-free, as the Kane episode 
illustrates. 
The application of the obstruction statutes to the president in particular 
would raise sensitive questions regarding the president’s proper role in law 
enforcement. Part I.B takes up those questions. 
3. Scope Limitations 
The scope of the federal prohibition on obstruction of justice has expanded 
incrementally over the course of nearly two centuries, with the result that the 
prohibition now applies to a wide swath of obstructive conduct affecting federal 
law enforcement. Three statutes in particular—sections 1503, 1505, and 1512 of 
 
 52. See Presentment No. 60 at 9–12, In re Thirty-Five Statewide Investigating Grand Jury, 624 
A.3d 204 (Pa. 2014) (No. 171 M.D. 2012, Notice No. 123), https://bit.ly/2vvozZW 
[https://perma.cc/VLQ5-W9KJ]. 
 53. See id. at 16. 
 54. Id. at 27. The language of the relevant Pennsylvania statute differs slightly from the federal 
analogue. It applies to anyone who “intentionally obstructs, impairs or perverts the administration of law 
or other governmental function by force, violence, physical interference or obstacle, breach of official 
duty, or any other unlawful act.” 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 5101. Pennsylvania courts have understood the 
provision to apply when a public official “perform[s] . . . a discretionary duty with an improper or 
corrupt motive.” See In re Gentile, 654 A.2d 676, 684 (Pa. Ct. Jud. Discipline 1994) (opinion of Johnson, 
J.). 
 55. See Jess Bidgood, Pennsylvania’s Attorney General Is Convicted on All Counts, N.Y. TIMES 
(Aug. 15, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/16/us/trial-kathleen-kane-pennsylvania-attorney-
general.html [https://perma.cc/NA6P-UVZD]. 
 56. As it turns out, the District Attorney of Montgomery County, Pa., who declined to prosecute 
comedian Bill Cosby in 2005, may have lost a later election because of that decision. See Justin Wm. 
Moyer, The Prosecutor Undone by a ‘Secret Agreement’ with Bill Cosby, WASH. POST (Feb. 4, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2016/02/04/the-prosecutor-undone-by-a-
secret-agreement-with-bill-cosby/?utm_term=.689dcd0b71ee [https://perma.cc/ZKT5-FX9U]. 
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title 1857—now cover conduct that interferes with the operations of the judicial, 
legislative, and executive branches. 
The first obstruction statute in 1831 applied only to obstruction of justice 
in federal court. And while the modern version of that statute, section 1503, now 
on its face applies more broadly to obstruction of the “due administration of 
justice” anywhere, courts have interpreted it to apply only to the obstruction of 
federal judicial proceedings (including grand jury investigations).58 Thus, 
obstruction of a federal criminal investigation prior to the filing of an indictment 
would not come within the scope of section 1503. 
Section 1505, enacted in 1940, does apply beyond federal court to 
obstruction of any proceeding pending before a “department or agency of the 
United States,” or before Congress.59 Just how far it applies has been a subject 
of confusion. For the first several decades after the statute’s enactment, courts 
routinely applied section 1505 to the obstruction of investigations by federal 
agencies, such as the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the SEC.60 But in a 
1981 case, United States v. Higgins, a federal district court held that section 1505 
did not apply to obstruction of an FBI probe.61 The district court said it was 
“convinced, after careful examination of the case law and pertinent legislative 
history,” that section 1505 applied only to agencies with rulemaking or 
adjudicative powers and not to purely investigatory agencies such as the FBI.62 
The “case law and pertinent legislative history” cited by Higgins offer little 
support for the court’s conclusion. Higgins relies on United States v. Mitchell, a 
1973 decision in which another district court stated that under section 1505 “it 
was not a crime to obstruct a criminal investigation or inquiry before the 
 
 57. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1503(a), 1505, 1512(b) (2018). 
 58. See United States v. Scoratow, 137 F. Supp. 620, 621–22 (W.D. Pa. 1956) (the phrase “‘due 
administration of justice’ . . . . is qualified and limited by the enumeration of specific judicial functions 
concerned with the ‘administration’ of justice.”) (emphasis in original); accord United States v. 
Simmons, 591 F.2d 206, 208 (3d Cir. 1979) (“A prerequisite for conviction [under section 1503] is the 
pendency at the time of the alleged obstruction of some sort of judicial proceeding that qualifies as an 
‘administration of justice.’”) (citations omitted); United States v. Ryan, 455 F.2d 728, 733 (9th Cir. 
1971) (noting that the Ninth Circuit has “approved the decision in United States v. Scoratow”); United 
States v. Bufalino, 285 F.2d 408, 416 (2d Cir. 1960) (citing Scoratow, 137 F. Supp 620) (“Falsehoods 
given before non-judicial inquiries are not encompassed within 18 U.S.C. § 1503, the federal obstruction 
of justice statute . . . .”). 
 59. Act of Jan. 13, 1940, ch. 1, § 135(a), 54 Stat. 13 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1505). 
 60. See United States v. Abrams, 427 F.2d 86, 90 (2d Cir. 1970) (Immigration and 
Naturalization Service); United States v. Fruchtman, 421 F.2d 1019, 1020–21 (6th Cir. 1970) (FTC); 
Rice v. United States, 356 F.2d 709, 712–13 (8th Cir. 1966) (National Labor Relations Board); United 
States v. Batten, 226 F. Supp. 492, 493–94 (D.D.C. 1964) (obstruction of SEC investigation); United 
States v. Brumfield, 85 F. Supp. 696, 699–704 (W.D. La. 1949) (obstruction of Federal Petroleum Board 
investigation). See generally United States v. Sutton, 732 F.2d 1483, 1490 (10th Cir. 1984) (“Agency 
investigative activities are ‘proceedings’ within the meaning of § 1505.”). 
 61. United States v. Higgins, 511 F. Supp. 453, 455 (W.D. Ky. 1981). 
 62. Id. 
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initiation of proceedings within the scope” of that statute.63 But Mitchell fails to 
resolve the question of what proceedings fall within the scope of section 1505; 
it simply notes that section 1505 applies only after such proceedings are 
underway. Moreover, the Second Circuit has since rejected Mitchell, holding that 
section 1505 does extend to investigations potentially leading to criminal 
charges.64 Meanwhile, the only legislative history supporting the Higgins court’s 
conclusion is a 1967 House Judiciary Committee report noting that “attempts to 
obstruct a criminal investigation or inquiry before a proceeding has been initiated 
are not within the proscription of [section 1505].”65 But again, the House 
Judiciary Committee report does not speak to the question of when a 
“proceeding” starts. 
Despite its shaky foundations, Higgins has had a wide impact. A number 
of other district courts have followed the decision.66 A Justice Department 
manual instructs federal prosecutors to abide by it, telling them that 
“investigations by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) are not section 1505 
proceedings.”67 Indeed, in 2009, after federal prosecutors in Virginia won a 
conviction under section 1505 for obstruction of an investigation by the FBI and 
the Drug Enforcement Agency, the government confessed error and conceded 
that the conviction should be vacated (as it was).68 Yet the Justice Department’s 
practice with respect to section 1505 is far from consistent. At almost the exact 
same time as the Virginia case, federal prosecutors in Missouri secured a 120-
month prison sentence for a defendant who had lied to FBI agents, on the theory 
that his conduct violated section 1505.69 On appeal, the Eighth Circuit upheld 
 
 63. United States v. Mitchell, 372 F. Supp. 1239, 1250 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (cited at Higgins, 511 
F. Supp. at 456). 
 64. See United States v. Schwartz, 924 F.2d 410, 423 (2d Cir. 1991); see also United States v. 
Lester, 749 F.2d 1288, 1298 (9th Cir. 1984) (rejecting Mitchell). Of course, the Higgins court did not 
know in 1981 that the Second Circuit would reject Mitchell a decade later. 
 65. H.R. REP. NO. 90-658, as reprinted in 1967 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1760, 1760. 
 66. See United States v. McDaniel, No. 12-28, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110475, at *14 (N.D. Ga. 
Jan. 29, 2013) (holding that an FBI investigation is “not a ‘proceeding’ under 18 U.S.C. § 1505”); United 
States v. Edgemon, No. 95-43, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23820, at *18 (E.D. Tenn. Aug. 18, 1997) 
(holding that a “mere criminal investigation” is “not a proceeding for purposes of § 1505”); United States 
v. Wright, 704 F. Supp. 613, 615 (D. Md. 1989) (holding that obstruction of an investigation by the US 
Attorney’s Office does not fall within the scope of section 1505 because the US Attorney “does not, to 
this Court’s knowledge, have either rule-making or adjudicative authority”). 
 67. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL 
§ 1727 (1997), https://www.justice.gov/usam/criminal-resource-manual-1727-protection-government-
processes-omnibus-clause-18-usc-1505 [https://perma.cc/TC7J-UV5H]. 
 68. United States v. Adams, 335 F. App’x 338, 342–43 (4th Cir. 2009). 
 69. See United States v. Hayes, 329 F. App’x 680, 681 (8th Cir. 2009) (summarizing procedural 
history). Hayes was convicted of violating the false statements statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2006), but his 
sentence was enhanced on grounds that his conduct also ran afoul of section 1505. See id. 
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the sentence.70 Other circuits that have weighed in on the question have not 
spoken with a single voice.71 
It is hard to explain why section 1505 should apply to obstruction of an 
investigation by the SEC or the FTC but not the FBI. The text of the statute does 
not command that result, and logic does not recommend it. And yet a defendant 
charged under section 1505 for obstructing a federal criminal investigation 
would have a plausible argument that, in light of the muddled case law, the rule 
of lenity weighs against applying the statute to his conduct. 
But even if an FBI investigation does not come within the scope of section 
1505, it might well fall within the scope of section 1512(c). That provision, 
enacted as part of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,72 makes it a crime to 
corruptly obstruct, influence, or impede “any official proceeding.” The term 
“official proceeding” is defined to mean any proceeding before a federal court 
or grand jury, a proceeding before Congress, or “a proceeding before a Federal 
Government agency which is authorized by law.”73 Section 1512 also states that 
“an official proceeding need not be pending or about to be instituted at the time 
of the offense.”74 
There are two ways in which an FBI investigation might fall within the 
scope of section 1512. First, an FBI investigation might be considered “a 
proceeding before a Federal Government agency which is authorized by law.” 
Federal law explicitly authorizes the FBI to “investigate any violation of Federal 
criminal law involving Government officers and employees.”75 Obstruction of 
an FBI investigation into official misconduct, then, might be considered 
 
 70. See id. While the Eighth Circuit did not squarely hold that section 1505 applies to FBI 
investigations, it said instead that, “[t]o the extent [the defendant] argues that an FBI investigation is not 
a ‘proceeding’ within the meaning of section 1505, we conclude any error was not plain because there 
is no precedent from the Supreme Court or this court directly resolving the issue.” Id. (citation omitted) 
(citing United States v. Higgins, 511 F. Supp. 453, 455 (W.D. Ky. 1981)). In other words, because the 
defendant had not preserved the issue below, he could not have his conviction overturned on those 
grounds on appeal. 
 71. The D.C. Circuit has held that an investigation by the Inspector General’s office of the US 
Agency for International Development (USAID) is a “proceeding” within the scope of section 1505 
because the office “is charged with the duty of supervising investigations relating to the proper operation 
of the agency” and because “the Inspector General is empowered to issue subpoenas and to compel 
sworn testimony in conjunction with an investigation of agency activities.” See United States v. Kelley, 
36 F.3d 1118, 1127 (1994). These factors distinguish the Inspector General’s office from the FBI, which 
has subpoena authority only in a small set of cases: investigations of federal health care offenses, federal 
offenses involving the sexual exploitation or abuse of children, and offenses related to controlled 
substances. See 18 U.S.C. § 3486(a)(1)(A)(i)(I) (2018); 21 U.S.C. § 876 (2018); 28 C.F.R. Pt. 0, Subpt. 
R, App. (2018). The Sixth Circuit, meanwhile, has said that an investigation by the Food and Drug 
Administration is a “proceeding” within the scope of section 1505 because “the FDA clearly possesses 
‘enhanced’ investigative powers,” such as the power to inspect the premises of businesses regulated by 
the Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act. See United States v. Pugh, 404 F. App’x 21, 26 (6th Cir. 2010). 
 72. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 1102, 116 Stat. 745, 807 (codified at 
18 U.S.C. § 1512(c) (2018)). 
 73. 18 U.S.C. § 1515(a) (2018). 
 74. 18 U.S.C. § 1512(f)(1) (2018). 
 75. 28 U.S.C. § 535(a) (2018). 
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obstruction of an “official proceeding” within section 1512’s ambit. Some 
federal courts have adopted the view that an FBI investigation is an “official 
proceeding” under section 1512,76 though others have rejected it.77 Second, 
obstruction of an FBI investigation that leads to a grand jury proceeding might 
be construed as obstruction of the grand jury proceeding, which would bring it 
within the scope of section 1512. Recall that an official proceeding “need not be 
pending or about to be instituted” at the time of the section 1512 offense. The 
relevant question under the case law is whether the official proceeding “was 
foreseeable [to the defendant] when he engaged in the proscribed conduct.”78 
Several federal courts have held that obstructing an FBI investigation that 
foreseeably leads to a federal grand jury probe does fall within the scope of 
section 1512.79 
To sum up so far: Federal law, through three different statutes, makes it a 
crime to “corruptly” obstruct, influence, or impede certain proceedings. Courts 
have construed the actus reus requirement broadly to include any action or course 
of action that obstructs justice. While much confusion has surrounded the mens 
rea requirement, Congress’s intervention in 1996 clarifies that “corruptly” refers 
to actions motivated by an “improper purpose.” And finally, while the outer 
contours of the obstruction statutes’ scope are somewhat blurry, these statutes 
clearly apply to obstruction of some federal agency investigations—and to 
obstruction of federal criminal investigations under certain circumstances. 
B. The President’s Role as Chief Law Enforcement Officer 
We argued above that whether an act counts as obstruction of justice 
depends on the legal role of the person who engages in the act. Because private 
citizens do not have any formal role in the legal system, except when they are 
jurors, any act by a private citizen to interfere with an investigation—including 
destruction of documents and lying to investigators—will generally be 
“improper” and thus “corrupt” for mens rea purposes. Public officials with 
 
 76. See, e.g., United States v. Plaskett, No. 2007-60, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62944, at *12 n.2 
(D.V.I. Aug. 13, 2008) (“To the extent [defendant] argues that the federal agency investigation does not 
constitute an official proceeding under Section 1512(c)(2), the Court is unpersuaded.”); United States v. 
Hutcherson, No. 6:05CR00039, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48708, at *7 (W.D. Va. July 5, 2006) 
(“Government agency actions, such as the FBI investigation of the defendant, are ‘official proceedings’ 
under Section 1512, whether or not a grand jury has been convened because Congress intended to deter 
obstruction of more than judicial proceedings with Section 1512.”) 
 77. See United States v. Ermoian, 752 F.3d 1165, 1172 (9th Cir. 2013) (“[W]e conclude that a 
criminal investigation is not an ‘official proceeding’ under the obstruction of justice statute.”); United 
States v. McDaniel, No. 2-12, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110475, at *6–13 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 29, 2013) 
(collecting cases). 
 78. United States v. Shavers, 693 F.3d 363, 378 (3d Cir. 2012); accord United States v. 
Martinez, 862 F.3d 223, 237 (2d Cir. 2017) (government must prove that official proceeding was 
“reasonably foreseeable to the defendant”). 
 79. See, e.g., United States v. Holloway, No. 08-224, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108387, at *15 
(E.D. Cal. Nov. 19, 2009); see also United States v. Frankhauser, 80 F.3d 641, 651–52 (1st Cir. 1996) 
(reaching the same result under the pre-Sarbanes-Oxley version of section 1512). 
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authority over law enforcement present a more complex situation. It is necessary 
to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate acts that interfere with an 
investigation. 
The president has broad discretion over prosecutorial decisions, but the 
exact breadth of this discretion has been a matter of controversy. The Vesting 
Clause of Article II gives the president “[t]he executive Power,”80 and the Take 
Care Clause instructs him to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”81 
Those provisions have been understood to give the president broad discretion 
over prosecutorial decisions.82 But the Supreme Court has rarely weighed in. Its 
most extensive treatment of the subject in recent decades came in the 1988 case 
Morrison v. Olson, involving the now-lapsed independent counsel statute.83 
Much of the discussion of presidential power over the last thirty years has taken 
Morrison as its starting point,84 and so will we. 
The story of Morrison starts with the Saturday Night Massacre of October 
20, 1973. On that evening, President Nixon ordered his attorney general to fire 
Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox, who was then leading the investigation into 
the Watergate scandal. The attorney general, Elliot Richardson, refused and 
resigned, as did his deputy. Ultimately, it fell to the third in line at the Justice 
Department, Solicitor General Robert Bork, to fire Cox.85 
That episode contributed to Congress passing the Ethics in Government Act 
of 1978,86 which limited the president’s power over certain prosecutions.87 One 
provision of the statute created an independent counsel with authority to 
investigate allegations of criminal behavior by executive branch officials, 
including the president, and to bring criminal charges in court.88 Under the law, 
the attorney general had the responsibility to request appointment of an 
independent counsel upon receipt of evidence that a covered official had 
committed a federal crime. Once the attorney general made that request, his 
power over the investigation was sharply limited. Authority to appoint the 
 
 80. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1. 
 81. Id. art. II, § 3. 
 82. See, e.g., Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Pierce, 786 F.2d 1199, 1201 (1986) (“The 
power to decide when to investigate, and when to prosecute, lies at the core of the Executive’s duty to 
see to the faithful execution of the laws . . . .”). 
 83. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 710 (1988) (explaining that the President’s 
constitutionally assigned duties “include complete control over investigation and prosecution of 
violations of the law.”). 
 84. See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 14 (1994) (“We begin with the narrow but revealing question of criminal prosecution, 
as presented in the contest over the independent counsel and resolved in Morrison v. Olson.”). 
 85. See Kenneth B. Noble, New Views Emerge of Bork’s Role in Watergate Dismissals, N.Y. 
TIMES (July 26, 1987), http://www.nytimes.com/1987/07/26/us/new-views-emerge-of-bork-s-role-in-
watergate-dismissals.html [https://perma.cc/3X4H-LM9D]. 
 86. Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824. 
 87. Nick Bravin, Note, Is Morrison v. Olson Still Good Law? The Court’s New Appointments 
Clause Jurisprudence, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1103, 1105 n.10 (1998). 
 88. Pub. L. No. 95-521, § 601, 92 Stat. at 1867-73. 
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independent counsel lay with a panel of federal judges, not the attorney general. 
And under the version of the statute that existed at the time of Morrison, the 
attorney general could remove the independent counsel only for good cause. The 
president himself lacked the authority to remove the independent counsel or 
otherwise intervene in the investigation.89 
The immediate issue in the Morrison case involved an independent counsel 
probe into whether a Justice Department official had committed obstruction or 
other crimes in his testimony to a House subcommittee regarding certain EPA 
documents. The broader question was whether the independent counsel statute 
violated the constitutional separation of powers.90 The Court concluded that it 
did not. Chief Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion acknowledged the 
“undeniable” fact that the statute “reduces the amount of control or supervision 
that the Attorney General and, through him, the President exercises over the 
investigation and prosecution of a certain class of alleged criminal activity.”91 
But in light of the attorney general’s role in initiating the independent counsel’s 
investigation and his power to remove the independent counsel for good cause, 
the Court said that the statute “give[s] the Executive Branch sufficient control 
over the independent counsel to ensure that the President is able to perform his 
constitutionally assigned duties.”92 
In a celebrated solo dissent, Justice Scalia charged that the majority in 
Morrison had effected an “important change in the equilibrium of power” among 
the branches.93 In his view, “the President’s constitutionally assigned duties 
include complete control over investigation and prosecution of violations of the 
law,”94 and the independent counsel statute deprived the president of that 
authority. According to Justice Scalia, the Vesting Clause of Article II must be 
read to give the president “not . . . some of the executive power, but all of the 
executive power.”95 Since the conduct of criminal investigations and 
prosecutions is a “purely” executive function, it cannot be assigned to anyone 
other than the president himself.96 This view, according to which the president 
alone “controls” law enforcement and hence cannot be forced to share that 
function with other branches or autonomous bodies, is now known as the unitary 
executive theory.97 For committed unitarians, Justice Scalia’s Morrison dissent 
is gospel. 
 
 89. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 660–65 (1988) (summarizing statute). 
 90. See id. at 665–69. 
 91. Id. at 695. 
 92. Id. at 696. 
 93. Id. at 699 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 94. Id. at 710. 
 95. Id. at 705. 
 96. See id. at 705, 733–34. 
 97. See Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the 
Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 544 (1994) (defining the unitary executive theory as the view that the 
“President must be able to control the execution of all federal laws”). While Calabresi and Prakash trace 
the unitary executive theory back to the writings of Locke, Blackstone, and Montesquieu, see id. at 605–
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Some commentators believe that the majority’s opinion in the case is 
perhaps no longer good law.98 Indeed, the independent counsel statute upheld in 
Morrison no longer is the law: a series of inquiries, culminating in the probe that 
led to the impeachment of President Clinton, persuaded many people that the 
independent counsel had grown too powerful. Congress decided to let the statute 
lapse rather than renew it when it expired in 1999.99 
While the rhetorical force of Scalia’s Morrison dissent is undeniable,100 
even the staunchest advocates of the unitary executive theory understand that 
Justice Scalia’s claim of “complete” presidential control over federal law 
enforcement cannot be taken literally.101 Under the founding document, 
Congress exerts control over law enforcement in numerous ways. The 
president’s appointments are subject to confirmation by the Senate, which means 
that the president may not be able to appoint loyalists to carry out his priorities. 
Congress defines most executive offices, which means that the president cannot 
combine or divide offices in the way that best advances his goals. And Congress 
holds the power of the purse, allowing it to threaten to withhold funds from 
presidents who do not respect Congress’s enforcement preferences.102 
Since the founding, Congress has imposed numerous additional constraints 
on the president’s enforcement discretion. Civil service laws restrict the 
president’s power to fire or punish lower-level subordinates who fail to carry out 
his policies.103 Congress has created thousands of offices whose occupants are 
protected by for-cause rules, and the Supreme Court has for the most part 
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that “ignores strong evidence that the framers imagined not a clear executive hierarchy with the President 
at the summit, but a large degree of congressional power to structure the administration as it thought 
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STANFORD LAWYER No. 92, (Spring 2015), https://law.stanford.edu/stanford-lawyer/articles/justice-
kagan-and-judges-srinivasan-and-kethledge-offer-views-from-the-bench/ [https://perma.cc/E8DU-
L5PN] (quoting Justice Kagan as saying that Justice Scalia’s Morrison opinion is “one of the greatest 
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 101. One account identifies three conditions of a unitary executive, which are fairly minimal: 
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Executive Privilege, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1143, 1155–56 (1999). 
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45 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 696, 704 (2007). 
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approved these actions despite the unitary executive theory.104 While Justice 
Scalia saw the independent counsel statute as fundamentally altering the 
interbranch equilibrium, a more accurate view is that the statute marked a modest 
reduction in the president’s executive power, hardly detectable against the 
background noise of countless adjustments to the scope of executive power over 
the centuries. 
Nor has anyone contended that the president can use any means to control 
executive branch officials. It has never been suggested, as far as we know, that 
the president enjoys the constitutional authority to reward and punish executive 
branch officers by giving them bonuses or subjecting them to fines without 
authorization from Congress. These types of rewards and punishments are 
essential to control subordinates in the commercial world; yet the president 
enjoys no constitutional entitlement to use them on his own subordinates. In 
practice, then, the president’s ability to control his subordinates is limited. 
The unitary executive theory also does not imply that the president can use 
his executive power to pursue any ends. The president would commit treason if 
he sought to stop an investigation in order to prevent the unmasking of an enemy 
spy in a time of war. The president would commit bribery if he called off an 
investigation in exchange for a payment from a suspect. This much is apparent 
from the fact that treason and bribery are impeachable offenses and from the fact 
that the Impeachment Judgment Clause clearly contemplates the possibility of 
prosecuting a former president for offenses that led to his removal.105 
The president’s enforcement discretion is limited by law in other ways as 
well. Congress can compel executive officials to regulate106 and to enforce 
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 106. See Mary M. Cheh, When Congress Commands a Thing to Be Done: An Essay on Marbury 
v. Madison, Executive Inaction, and the Duty of the Courts to Enforce the Law, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
253, 276 (2003) (explaining that Congress “sometimes assigns administrative agencies the task of 
adopting rules, regulations, standards, or guidelines to specify and implement Congress’s general 
objectives.”). 
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noncriminal statutes,107 and the courts can issue injunctions against executive 
branch officials and hold them in contempt if they disobey those commands.108 
Whether the courts have jurisdiction to enjoin the president in his official 
capacity is less clear.109 The issue arises rarely, however, because most laws are 
enforced by executive branch officials at or below the cabinet level rather than 
by the president himself. There are also background constitutional norms and 
procedural protections, including due process and recourse to habeas corpus, that 
operate as limits on presidential action.110 
At the same time, it is widely accepted that the president has authority to 
refuse to enforce the law under certain circumstances. The president can very 
likely refuse to defend a law that he believes to be unconstitutional in court,111 
and he can probably refuse to enforce a law against violators on grounds of 
unconstitutionality as well.112 He can definitely allocate enforcement resources 
across laws (voting rights laws versus corporate fraud laws), or types of law 
enforcement (prosecution of drug kingpins versus drug users).113 He can set 
priorities and areas of focus. He may be able to refuse to enforce certain laws 
wholesale merely because he disapproves of them on policy grounds, though this 
is the subject of heated and inconclusive debate.114 The extent of his discretion 
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will likely depend on whether we are talking about civil law or criminal law, and 
whether or not Congress has tried to constrain him.115 
The ambiguity of the limits on the president’s enforcement power reflect 
an uneasy compromise among constantly evolving policy considerations. The 
enforcement power must be, to a large degree, discretionary because of the 
nature of our legal system. Congress has passed many more laws than could be 
enforced in a mechanical way, and there does not seem to be any neutral, 
judicially enforceable standard for allocating enforcement resources among 
laws. Once it is recognized that law enforcement must be discretionary, the 
normative question about whether executive branch officials should exercise 
discretion is settled. Is implies ought. But theorists have made a virtue of this 
necessity. They argue that because the president sits atop the executive, and is 
subject to electoral constraints, he is the best person to bear the responsibility of 
enforcing the law in the public interest.116 There is also the concern that if 
Congress can constrain the president’s enforcement power, the president would 
not serve as a check on legislative tyranny.117 
The countervailing worry is that the president may abuse his enforcement 
discretion. Of course, it was this worry—which seemed more than justified in 
the wake of Watergate—that led to the enactment of the independent counsel 
statute in the first place. But concerns about abuse of power extend beyond 
narrow cases of self-dealing and protection of political allies. Democrats argued 
that President Reagan exceeded his executive authority by failing to enforce 
environmental laws,118 and—two decades later—that President George W. Bush 
stretched the limits of his constitutional power through lackluster enforcement 
of civil rights statutes.119 Republicans argued that President Obama violated the 
Take Care Clause by failing to deport large classes of undocumented immigrants 
after Congress rejected a law that would have given them a path to citizenship.120 
Critics of executive power worry that if the president’s enforcement discretion 
is truly plenary, then he can effectively veto laws that he does not like—at least, 
for the duration of the administration—even if an actual veto has been 
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overridden.121 Such a view may seem inconsistent with the text of the 
Constitution, which gives primary policy-making authority to Congress. It is 
even more clearly inconsistent with the goals of the Founders, who rejected a 
proposal to give the president “dispensing” power—the power to suspend laws—
which was a controversial feature of the British king’s executive power before 
the Glorious Revolution.122 
Hence the dialectic between power and constraint. The president should 
enjoy some core discretionary power, but he cannot go too far.123 Obama-era 
controversies—especially involving immigration nonenforcement—clarified the 
stakes of the conflict but failed to resolve it.124 What some saw as a justifiable 
exercise of discretion in response to congressional gridlock,125 others saw as a 
potentially impeachable offense.126 
The unresolved debate over presidential enforcement runs parallel to 
arguments regarding the discretionary power of lower-level prosecutors. Courts 
sometimes say that federal prosecutors, or the attorney general, enjoy absolute 
discretion to decide whether to pursue charges in criminal cases.127 But such 
claims are overbroad. The courts have acknowledged that constitutional 
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limitations, including due process, apply to prosecutorial discretion.128 For 
example, the Supreme Court has declared that the prosecutor must be 
“disinterested.”129 Numerous cases confirm that the principle of prosecutorial 
discretion does not entitle the prosecutor to bring charges when he has a conflict 
of interest.130 Likewise, constitutional tort claims can be brought against 
prosecutors for extreme abuses of prosecutorial discretion, such as agreeing to 
drop cases in return for bribes or sexual favors, or demanding that a defendant 
swear a religious oath.131 
It is true that complaints about abuse of prosecutorial discretion typically 
lead to judicial remedies when prosecutors bring cases, not when they refuse to 
bring cases. For obvious reasons, criminal defendants never try to persuade a 
court to compel the prosecutor to bring charges against other people, in order to 
produce equality of outcomes but not an outcome desired by the defendant. The 
pattern might cause one to think that the law gives more freedom to prosecutors 
not to bring cases than to bring cases. But the law has never been defined this 
way.132 The pattern reflects a remedial asymmetry. When a defendant complains 
about a prosecutor’s bias, a court can easily offer a remedy by releasing the 
defendant or ordering the prosecutor off the case. When a prosecutor’s bias 
results in a failure to bring a case, it is harder for the court to do anything about 
it. Judges, as they have recognized, are in a poor position to order prosecutors to 
bring cases, as it would require them to supervise the case and ensure that the 
prosecutor did not skimp on effort or resources.133 But this asymmetry does not 
mean that a biased prosecutor’s refusal to bring charges is lawful; rather, it is 
illegal but hard to remedy.134 
With respect to the scope of the president’s enforcement discretion, these 
precedents involving lower-level prosecutors are instructive, but they are not 
determinative. One can certainly argue that the president, given the greater 
breadth of his portfolio and his more direct accountability to the electorate, ought 
to have wider discretion over enforcement decisions than a lower-level 
prosecutor. Roger Taney, who would eventually serve as chief justice of the 
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1302 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  106:1277 
Supreme Court and ensure his infamy as the author of the Dred Scott decision, 
articulated an early version of this argument while he was President Jackson’s 
attorney general.135 President Jackson had directed a federal prosecutor to drop 
a controversial case involving jewels stolen from a Dutch princess. The secretary 
of state asked the attorney general whether the president’s action was lawful. In 
his Jewels of the Princess Orange opinion, Taney concluded that it was. While 
conceding that it would have been improper for the prosecutor to dismiss the 
case on his own,136 Taney said that it was “within the legitimate power of the 
President to direct [the prosecutor] to institute or to discontinue a pending 
suit . . . whenever the interest of the United States is directly or indirectly 
concerned.”137 
Yet notably, neither Taney in Jewels of the Princess Orange nor Scalia in 
Morrison argued that the president’s prosecutorial discretion grants him the 
power to pursue or drop a case for any reason whatsoever.138 Other advocates of 
the unitary executive theory do not make that claim either, and such an argument 
would be inconsistent with the constitutional framework. As we have observed 
above, the founders explicitly stated that the laws against treason and bribery 
would apply to the president, and that the president might be prosecuted after 
impeachment and removal for committing those offenses while in office. And as 
Gary McDowell has noted,139 the Constitution’s framers were familiar with Sir 
William Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England, which listed 
“obstructing the execution of lawful process” as a “very high” offense against 
“public justice.”140 Against this backdrop, the constitutional reference to “high 
Crimes and Misdemeanors” seems even more clearly to suggest that the crime 
of obstruction would apply to the president. At the same time, as the analysis 
above illustrates, the obstruction of justice laws cannot be applied to the 
president without some accommodation for his unique role in the constitutional 
scheme. Fortunately for lawyers and lawmakers today who are faced with the 
task of reconciling the obstruction statutes with the president’s prosecutorial 
 
 135. The Jewels of the Princess of Orange, 2 Op. Att’y Gen. 482 (1831). 
 136. See id. at 490 (stating “the prosecution must go on, even if, in point of fact, it is groundless 
and unjust, unless the President may lawfully interfere, and authorize and direct the district attorney to 
strike it off”). 
 137. Id. at 492; see also Andrias, supra note 114, at 1052 (stating that Taney’s opinion “illustrates 
the degree to which enforcement decisions regarding the most pressing issues facing the country have 
been thought to be at the core of the President’s authority and responsibility”). 
 138. Justice Scalia suggested that the foreign relations consequences of a law enforcement action 
should be relevant to the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. But while he said that such considerations 
could be considered “political,” he emphasized that they were political “in the nonpartisan sense.” See 
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 708 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Thus, even Justice Scalia appeared 
to accept the proposition that intervening in an investigation for partisan purposes would be improper. 
 139. Gary L. McDowell, High Crimes and Misdemeanors: Recovering the Intentions of the 
Founders, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 626, 641 (1999). 
 140. IV COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 86 (Ruth Paley ed., Oxford Univ. Press, 
2016) (1765–69) (emphases omitted). 
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powers, several decades of historical precedents provide helpful guidance as they 
contemplate this challenge. 
C. Historical Precedents 
The obstruction allegations against President Trump do not present the first 
time in modern American history that a sitting president or high-ranking White 
House official has been accused of obstruction. In this section we review four 
previous episodes involving accusations of obstruction by the president or his 
closest advisors: the Watergate scandal, the Iran-Contra affair, the impeachment 
of Bill Clinton, and the controversy over the firing of nine US attorneys in 2006. 
These episodes provide support for the notions that a president who uses his 
position of power to obstruct a federal investigation or proceeding commits an 
impeachable offense, and that interference in a criminal investigation for partisan 
advantage falls within the definition of obstruction. 
1. Watergate 
The first sitting president to face serious allegations of obstruction was 
Richard Nixon, who was accused of interfering with the FBI’s investigation into 
the break-in at the Democratic National Committee’s Watergate headquarters. 
The first article of impeachment reported out by the House Judiciary Committee 
in July 1974 charged that Nixon had “prevented, obstructed, and impeded the 
administration of justice” through (among other means) “endeavouring to 
interfere with the conduct of investigations” by the Justice Department and the 
FBI and “endeavouring to misuse the Central Intelligence Agency.”141 The 
“smoking gun” in the Watergate scandal was a tape-recorded conversation from 
June 1972 in which Nixon and his chief of staff, H.R. Haldeman, concocted a 
plan to instruct the deputy chief of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to tell 
the FBI director to call off the bureau’s probe into the Watergate burglary.142 
The vote on the first article of impeachment was 27-11, with six 
Republicans joining all twenty-one of the Committee’s Democrats in the 
majority.143 After Nixon’s resignation, however, all eleven Republicans who 
voted against the first article of impeachment submitted a statement 
acknowledging that, in light of subsequent revelations, they believed that Nixon 
had committed obstruction.144 Nixon himself, while contesting the factual 
allegations against him, acknowledged at a press conference prior to leaving 
office that “of course, the crime of obstruction of justice is a serious crime and 
 
 141. RODINO, supra note 3, at 2. 
 142. Andrew Martin, The Smoking Gun that Took Down Nixon: One from the History Books, 
BLOOMBERG (May 16, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-05-16/the-smoking-
gun-that-took-down-nixon-one-from-the-history-books [https://perma.cc/HL99-F84F]. 
 143. RODINO, supra note 3, at 10. 
 144. Id. at 361 (statement of Representative Hutchinson et al.); see also id. at 493 (statement of 
Representative Mayne). 
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would be an impeachable offense.”145 Thus, while the Watergate affair did not 
result in a judicial ruling or a precedent of the full House or Senate to the effect 
that the crime of obstruction applies to presidential interference in a federal 
criminal investigation, the episode did reveal a bipartisan consensus—with 
which Nixon himself concurred—that the president did not stand above the 
obstruction laws. 
There is a subtle question as to whether the Nixon case supports the view 
that the president can commit a crime of obstruction of justice or rather that 
obstruction by the president is a political offense that may justify impeachment 
but not indictment. The eleven Republican minority members of the House 
Judiciary Committee who initially voted against impeachment but subsequently 
switched their views on the first article made clear that they took the former 
position: Nixon, in their final analysis, violated the criminal obstruction 
statutes.146 One member who voted in favor of impeachment likewise voiced the 
view that Nixon’s obstruction was not only impeachable but also criminal.147 
An alternative approach to the question of whether Nixon’s obstruction was 
a crime is to imagine what would have happened if Ford had not pardoned Nixon: 
would he have been convicted of obstruction? Probably. The pardon itself 
implies that Ford believed that Nixon faced criminal liability of some sort, but 
we do not know whether Nixon would have faced criminal liability for 
obstruction of justice or for other offenses. At a minimum though, we know that 
at least a dozen members of the House Judiciary Committee did believe that a 
president could commit the crime of obstruction. That is one point in favor of the 
view that obstruction laws apply to the president, though it falls well short of 
resolving the matter. 
2. Iran-Contra 
In November 1986, news broke that Reagan administration officials had 
facilitated the sale of weapons to the Iranian government and used some of the 
 
 145. The President’s News Conference (Mar. 6, 1974), in THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT 
(Gerhard Peters & John T. Woolley eds., 2017), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=4377 
[https://perma.cc/LV3X-77DB]. 
 146. The minority members concluded: 
We recognize that the majority of the Committee, as well as its Special Counsel, apparently 
do not consider it necessary or appropriate to charge impeachable offenses in terms of the 
violation of specific Federal criminal statutes, such as Title 18 U.S.C. § 371 (conspiracy), 
§ 1001 (false statements to a government agency), or §§ 1503, 1505 and 1510 (obstruction 
of justice) . . . . We disagree. To the contrary, we believe the evidence warrants the 
conclusion that the President did conspire with a number of his aides and subordinates to 
delay, impede and obstruct the investigation of the Watergate affair by the Department of 
Justice. 
RODINO, supra note 3, at 382 (statement of Representative Hutchinson et al.). 
 147. See Debate on Articles of Impeachment: Hearings of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 93rd 
Cong., 2d Sess., at 307 (1974) (statement of Rep. Railsback). It is not clear whether others who voted 
for the first article shared Representative Railsback’s view. 
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proceeds to finance the Contra rebels in Nicaragua, notwithstanding a 
congressional prohibition on aid to the Contras. Two Reagan administration 
officials—National Security Advisor John Poindexter and National Security 
Council staffer Oliver North—would be convicted of obstructing a congressional 
inquiry into the Iran-Contra affair, but their convictions would later be 
vacated.148 A third official, former Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, was 
indicted for obstruction of justice in 1992 but pardoned by then-President George 
H.W. Bush before going to trial.149 
During his investigation of the Iran-Contra affair, Independent Counsel 
Lawrence Walsh considered whether obstruction charges should be filed against 
President Reagan. Walsh ultimately decided not to pursue the charges, 
explaining that “the fundamental reason for lack of prosecutorial effort was the 
absence of proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the President knew that the 
statements being made to Congress were false, or that acts of obstruction were 
being committed by Poindexter, North and others.”150 Walsh also considered 
obstruction charges against Edwin Meese, who served as attorney general under 
President Reagan from 1985 to 1988. Again, Walsh declined to prosecute Meese 
because of insufficient evidence, not because of any view that the attorney 
general’s prosecutorial discretion made him immune from obstruction 
liability.151 Walsh added in his final report that the criminal investigation of 
George H.W. Bush—who served as vice president under Reagan and then 
succeeded him as president—was “regrettably incomplete.”152 
The Iran-Contra affair differs from Watergate in an important respect: the 
obstruction allegations involved obstruction of congressional inquiries, and since 
the president does not have prosecutorial discretion with respect to congressional 
probes, the difficult questions concerning presidential obstruction that arise with 
respect to executive branch investigations did not come up. But most important 
for our purposes, the Watergate-era view that the president can commit 
obstruction does not appear to have been weakened. 
3. The Impeachment of Bill Clinton 
In December 1998, Bill Clinton became just the second president in 
American history to be impeached. One of the two articles of impeachment 
reported out of the House charged the president with obstruction of justice. The 
specific allegations in the House impeachment report were that Clinton 
 
 148. See United States v. North, 910 F.2d 843 (D.C. Cir. 1990); United States v. Poindexter, 951 
F.2d 369 (D.C. Cir. 1991). 
 149. See Walter Pincus, Bush Pardons Weinberger in Iran-Contra Affair, WASH. POST (Dec. 25 
1992), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/03/28/AR2006032800858.html 
[https://perma.cc/ZBR6-B3BX]. 
 150. LAWRENCE E. WALSH, FINAL REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL FOR IRAN/CONTRA 
MATTERS: INVESTIGATIONS AND PROSECUTIONS 465 (1993). 
 151. Id. at ch. 31. 
 152. Id. at ch. 28. 
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encouraged former White House intern Monica Lewinsky and Oval Office 
secretary Betty Currie to give false testimony in a sexual harassment lawsuit 
against him, that he allowed his attorney to make false and misleading statements 
to a federal judge in the harassment suit, and that he lied to aides about his 
relationship with Lewinsky knowing that the aides would repeat those lies to a 
federal grand jury.153 
The impeachment of President Clinton was controversial in many respects, 
and the Senate ultimately split 50–50 on the article of impeachment charging 
obstruction. Yet at no point during the impeachment proceedings was there 
debate as to whether presidential obstruction could be an impeachable offense or 
whether a president could be charged criminally for obstruction following 
removal. The House Judiciary Committee’s report said that the first article of 
impeachment against Nixon had established a “clear precedent” that a president 
who used his position of power to obstruct the administration of justice 
committed an impeachable offense.154 The Judiciary Committee report also 
concluded that Clinton’s obstruction of a pending federal judicial proceeding 
was a crime within the scope of section 1503.155 Democrats on the House 
Judiciary Committee disputed the factual allegations against Clinton but did not 
dispute the majority’s claim that presidential obstruction is a potentially 
impeachable and criminal offense.156 
The view that presidential obstruction is both impeachable and criminal 
emerges even more clearly from the Senate proceedings. The trial memorandum 
submitted by the House to the Senate argued that President Clinton’s conduct 
“might easily have been charged under [the obstruction] statutes.”157 President 
Clinton’s brief to the Senate also acknowledged section 1503 as providing the 
“applicable law.”158 Senators from both parties, including supporters and 
opponents of Clinton’s removal, recognized in floor statements that section 1503 
applied to the president (though they disagreed as to whether the president had 
violated the provision).159 A letter from more than 430 law professors opposing 
impeachment nonetheless agreed that “obstructing justice can without doubt be 
 
 153. IMPEACHMENT OF WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, 
H.R. REP. NO. 105-830, at 63–74 (1998). 
 154. Id. at 119. 
 155. See id. at 64, 120–21. 
 156. See id. at 243–57 (minority views). 
 157. Proceedings of the United States Senate in the Impeachment Trial of President William 
Jefferson Clinton, S. DOC. NO. 106-4, at 813 (1999) (Trial Mem. of the U.S. House of Representatives). 
 158. See id. at 961. 
 159. See S. DOC. NO. 106–4, at 2580 (statement of Sen. Biden) (“If your aim is to respect the rule 
of law, you must also respect the rules of law—the precise legal definitions of the crimes, as found 
in . . . 18 U.S.C. §§ 1503 and 1512, the applicable Federal obstruction of justice statutes”); id. at 2596–
97 (statement of Sen. Frist); id. at 2780 (statement of Sen. Thompson); id. at 2926–27 (statement of Sen. 
Feingold); id. at 3077 (statement of Sen. Hatch); id. at 3113 (statement of Sen. Reed). 
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impeachable” as well as criminal.160 The professors argued that “making false 
statements about sexual improprieties is not a sufficient constitutional basis to 
justify the trial and removal from office of the President of the United States,” 
but they emphasized that—by contrast—a “President who corruptly used the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation to obstruct an investigation would have 
criminally exercised his presidential powers.”161 
As in Iran-Contra, most of the presidential obstruction questions in the 
Clinton case did not involve the same questions of prosecutorial discretion that 
we discuss in Part I.B. The allegations against Clinton centered around 
obstruction of the administration of justice in a civil proceeding initiated by a 
private citizen, rather than interference with an executive branch investigation. 
Insofar as Clinton obstructed a grand jury inquiry, it was the independent 
counsel—and not a prosecutor under the president’s control—who was 
spearheading the investigation. Nonetheless, we think it relevant that Clinton’s 
accusers and defenders both accepted the proposition that a president who uses 
his position of power to obstruct an investigation thereby commits an 
impeachable offense and a crime. 
4. Dismissal of US Attorneys Under George W. Bush 
The dismissal of nine US attorneys by President George W. Bush in 2006 
provided the most recent occasion (prior to Trump’s tenure) for considering the 
interaction between prosecutorial discretion and criminal obstruction. The most 
controversial of these was the dismissal of David Iglesias as the US attorney for 
the District of New Mexico.162 According to a subsequent Justice Department 
report, several New Mexico Republicans had pressured Iglesias to investigate 
voter fraud allegations more aggressively and to bring an indictment against 
former Democratic State Senator Manny Aragon prior to the November 2006 
election. In December of that year, after Iglesias had failed to bring charges 
against the Democratic politician, a senior official in the Bush administration 
Justice Department asked Iglesias to resign. Iglesias stepped down later that 
month. The acting US attorney who replaced Iglesias brought charges against 
Aragon in March of the following year.163 
In September 2008, the Justice Department’s Office of the Inspector 
General and Office of Professional Responsibility released a report on the firing 
of Iglesias and the eight other US attorneys. The report recommended the 
 
 160. Bernard J. Hibbitts, More than 430 Law Professors Send Letter to Congress Opposing 
Impeachment, JURIST (Nov. 6, 1998), 
https://web.archive.org/web/19990128143405/http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/petit1.htm 
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 161. Id. 
 162. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN. & OFFICE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE REMOVAL OF NINE U.S. ATTORNEYS IN 2006, at 42 (2008). 
 163. See id. at 155–86. 
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appointment of a special counsel to investigate the Iglesias firing more fully.164 
The report went on to say: 
While we found no case charging a violation of the obstruction of justice 
statute involving an effort to accelerate a criminal prosecution for 
partisan political purposes, we believe that pressuring a prosecutor to 
indict a case more quickly to affect the outcome of an upcoming election 
could be a corrupt attempt to influence the prosecution in violation of 
the obstruction of justice statute. The same reasoning could apply to 
pressuring a prosecutor to take partisan political considerations into 
account in his charging decisions in voter fraud matters.165 
Then-Attorney General Michael Mukasey appointed a federal prosecutor 
from Connecticut to conduct an investigation into Iglesias’s firing. The special 
prosecutor’s investigation ended in 2010 without any criminal charges being 
filed. A letter from the Justice Department to the chairman of the House Judiciary 
Committee relayed the special prosecutor’s conclusion that the evidence was 
“insufficient to establish an attempt to pressure Mr. Iglesias to accelerate his 
charging decisions.”166 
The Iglesias episode is likely to go down in history as a footnote. But even 
as a footnote, it supports an important proposition: at least in the view of the 
Justice Department, public officials can commit the crime of obstruction not just 
by thwarting an investigation for political reasons but by propelling an 
investigation forward for political ends.167 
D. Synthesizing the Obstruction Statutes and Article II 
The primary challenge in applying the obstruction statutes to the president 
comes in defining the mens rea of “corruptly” in a manner that respects the 
president’s role as the head of the executive branch. Recall that Congress and the 
courts have construed “corruptly” to refer to “improper purpose.”168 The 
president does not act corruptly when his actions follow from a good faith effort 
to fulfill his constitutional responsibilities. For example, if the president 
interferes with an investigation because he thinks it might reveal the identity of 
an undercover intelligence operative abroad, or because he worries it might bring 
 
 164. Id. at 198. 
 165. Id. at 199. 
 166. Letter from Ronald Weich, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Legislative 
Affairs, to Hon. John Conyers, Jr., Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. House of 
Representatives (July 21, 2010), http://legaltimes.typepad.com/files/conyers.dannehy.ola.resp.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/RLM9-23B6]. 
 167. It might seem odd to say that advancing an investigation could be an obstruction of justice. 
One possible interpretation of this view is that bringing a case that was not justified interferes with the 
“due administration of justice” because it could result in a wrongful conviction. Another interpretation 
is that the obstruction consists of bringing a case before it was ready, risking the acquittal of a guilty 
party in order to obtain the short-term political advantage of a public indictment shortly before an 
election (rather than a conviction after it). 
 168. See supra note 50. 
2018] PRESIDENTIAL OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE 1309 
us to the brink of war with a hostile nation, his actions follow from an appropriate 
conception of his commander-in-chief responsibilities and so cannot constitute 
obstruction. So too, when the president intervenes because he believes that an 
investigation amounts to a waste of scarce enforcement resources, his actions 
follow from his responsibilities under the Take Care Clause and are likewise 
noncriminal.169 
Moreover, the president need not justify each exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion by drawing a link back to a particular provision of Article II. As the 
Supreme Court noted in the 1996 case of United States v. Armstrong: 
The Attorney General and United States Attorneys retain broad 
discretion to enforce the Nation’s criminal laws. They have this latitude 
because they are designated by statute as the President’s delegates to 
help him discharge his constitutional responsibility to “take Care that 
the Laws be faithfully executed.” As a result, the presumption of 
regularity supports their prosecutorial decisions and, in the absence of 
clear evidence to the contrary, courts presume that they have properly 
discharged their official duties.170 
If the presumption of regularity attaches to the prosecutorial decisions of 
the attorney general and the US attorneys because they are the president’s 
delegates, then that presumption applies to the prosecutorial decisions of the 
president as well. But the presumption of regularity is not irrebuttable.171 That 
is, one begins from the premise that the president intervened in the investigation 
to carry out his Article II responsibilities, and one usually ends there—but not 
always. 
When might a president’s intervention in an investigation or other 
proceeding overcome the presumption of regularity? The Justice Department’s 
regulations for prosecutors provide a starting point for thinking about this 
problem. They forbid a prosecutor to take part in an investigation where she has 
a “personal or political relationship” with the subject or someone connected with 
the investigation.172 Personal relationship “means a close and substantial 
connection of the type normally viewed as likely to induce partiality,”173 such as 
a “relationship with . . . father, mother, brother, sister, child and spouse.”174 
 
 169. Cf. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Pierce, 786 F.2d 1199, 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (“The 
power to decide when to investigate, and when to prosecute, lies at the core of the Executive’s duty to 
see to the faithful execution of the laws . . . .”). 
 170. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) (citations and some internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 171. Wilson v. United States, 369 F.2d 198, 200 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (the presumption may be 
overcome, for example, by showing that the official actions were “in violation of prescribed 
procedures”). 
 172. 28 C.F.R. § 45.2(a) (2018). The regulation is authorized by a statute that directs the attorney 
general to disqualify Justice Department employees from cases in which they have conflicts of interest. 
28 U.S.C. § 528 (2018). 
 173. Id. § 45.2(c)(2). 
 174. Id. 
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Political relationship means “a close identification with an elected official, a 
candidate (whether or not successful) for elective, public office, a political party, 
or a campaign organization.”175 Involvement in investigations where the 
prosecutor has a personal or political relationship with the target is improper 
because the prosecutor will be tempted to interfere with the normal course of law 
enforcement.176 These regulations operate against the backdrop of a federal 
conflict of interest statute that imposes criminal penalties177 upon federal officers 
and employees who “participate[] personally” in matters in which they, their 
spouses, or their minor children have a “financial interest.”178 
While these regulations for prosecutors provide a starting point, the 
president’s role differs in several ways—two of which suggest that the president 
should be given more freedom than prosecutors have. First, the president has a 
political relationship with many more people, including almost every major 
official in the executive branch and every important member of his party. If the 
obstruction statutes are applied to the president, he must recuse himself from 
countless investigations where there may be a valid public reason to intervene. 
Second, the president, unlike a prosecutor, is responsible for national security, 
public order, and other important areas of national life, and plays a significant 
role in setting public policy. He therefore needs flexibility to block investigations 
that interfere with the broad public interest. 
Yet, there are two countervailing factors that suggest a president should 
have less freedom than prosecutors have. First, the president is almost never 
directly involved in an investigation. Because of the nature of his position, he 
does not have the time or inclination; typically, he takes part in law enforcement 
by setting priorities and appointing officials to oversee the process.179 While he 
needs to have the freedom to set priorities, he can also often recuse himself from 
individual investigations without sacrificing too much executive authority. 
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 176. See id. § 45.2(b). If an employee’s supervisor determines that the employee has a personal 
or political relationship with the person under investigation, the employee may not participate in the 
investigation unless the supervisor determines that the relationship will not affect the impartiality of the 
employee’s service and that “[t]he employee’s participation would not create an appearance of a conflict 
of interest.” 
 177. See 18 U.S.C. § 208(a) (2018) (violators subject to penalties under § 216). Cf. 18 U.S.C. 
§ 216(a)(2) (2018) (penalty of up to five years imprisonment for willful violation). 
 178. 18 U.S.C. § 208(a). Note that the definition of “officer” here does not include the president, 
vice president, members of Congress, or federal judges. See 18 U.S.C. § 202(c) (2018). 
 179. A recent example is the different approaches to drug law enforcement of the Obama and 
Trump administrations. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE ATT’Y GEN., MEMORANDUM FOR 
ALL FEDERAL PROSECUTORS: DEPARTMENT CHARGING AND SENTENCING POLICY (2017), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/965896/download [https://perma.cc/7EQW-EMAF] 
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criminal penalties); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATT’Y GEN., MEMORANDUM FOR 
ALL UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS: GUIDANCE REGARDING MARIJUANA ENFORCEMENT (2013), 
https://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/3052013829132756857467.pdf [https://perma.cc/M6ZT-
3JGV] (instructing Department of Justice employees to leave enforcement of low-level marijuana 
offenses to local authorities). 
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Second, the president has immensely more power than an ordinary prosecutor 
and is subject to fewer bureaucratic constraints. If the president abuses his power, 
he can do much more harm than any prosecutor can. 
Thus, while an argument could be made that the president obstructs justice 
whenever he interferes with an investigation in a way that is not consistent with 
his constitutional and legal role, this seems to us too broad because the outer 
limits of the president’s authority are ambiguous and subject to disagreement. A 
more sensible approach would be to apply the obstruction statutes narrowly to 
cases where there is no serious claim that the president’s motive is consistent 
with his public role. The presumption of regularity would apply except when the 
president seeks to advance interests that are narrowly personal (e.g., the well-
being of family members), pecuniary (e.g., the procurement of a bribe), or 
partisan (e.g., winning the next election or aiding the electoral prospects of a 
party member). 
This conclusion is informed not only by the ethical and legal guidelines 
applicable to prosecutors, but also by structural inferences drawn from the 
Constitution. For example, the founders acknowledged the impropriety of a 
public official participating in a proceeding in which he has a personal stake: 
hence the rule that the chief justice, rather than the vice president, presides over 
the Senate trial of an impeached president.180 The vice president—who normally 
presides over the Senate181—would have an obvious personal stake in the 
president’s trial, because the vice president is next in the order of succession. 
The founders also included a number of constitutional provisions designed to 
combat financial conflicts of interest, including the Ineligibility Clause182 and 
the Foreign183 and Domestic Emoluments Clauses.184 And while the Constitution 
does not specifically regulate the use of public office for partisan purposes, that 
is probably because the Founders envisioned a republic without parties. 
 
 180. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6. 
 181. Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 4. 
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CORNELL L. REV. 341, 358–62 (2009). 
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Believing parties to be a “political evil,”185 they certainly would have thought it 
improper for the president to use his position of power in pursuit of narrowly 
partisan ends. 
Translating these structural inferences into a legal standard for presidential 
obstruction of justice is not an entirely straightforward exercise. But this is 
precisely the exercise that a court would have to undertake in the event that a 
president (or former president) is prosecuted on charges that he committed 
obstruction while in office. We suggest that the following standard best 
synthesizes the legal materials we have examined: A president commits 
obstruction of justice when he significantly interferes with an investigation, 
prosecution, or other law enforcement action to advance narrowly personal, 
pecuniary, or partisan interests. He does not, however, commit obstruction when 
he acts on the basis of a legitimate and good faith conception of his constitutional 
responsibilities, even if he receives a personal or pecuniary benefit or 
incidentally advances his party’s interests.186 
We address questions of mixed motives at greater length in Part II.A. For 
now, let us define some of the terms. “Significant interference” means a direct 
order to a responsible subordinate (like an FBI agent or Justice Department 
lawyer) to drop an investigation, prosecution, or other law enforcement activity, 
or to ensure that it is not completed to professional standards. Significant 
interference could also take place less directly—for example, by conveying the 
order through intermediaries. And significant interference need not be limited to 
thwarting an investigation: a president might interfere with an investigation, we 
suppose, by ordering a subordinate to bring an indictment against a political 
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ADAMS 511 (Charles Francis Adams ed., Little, Brown & Co., 1854). 
 186. After we posted a draft of this Article on the Social Science Research Network, law 
professors Alan Dershowitz and Josh Blackman both argued that a president cannot be prosecuted for 
obstruction of justice if his actions are constitutionally authorized. See Alan M. Dershowitz, Opinion, 
No One Is Above the Law, HILL (Dec. 5, 2017), http://thehill.com/opinion/judiciary/363387-no-one-is-
above-the-law [https://perma.cc/6V4B-5229] (“My argument . . . is not that a president can never be 
charged with obstruction of justice. It is that he cannot be charged with that crime if his only actions 
were constitutionally authorized.”); Josh Blackman, Obstruction of Justice and the Presidency: Part I, 
LAWFARE (Dec. 5, 2017, 5:27 PM), https://lawfareblog.com/obstruction-justice-and-presidency-part-i 
[https://perma.cc/M5WA-RY5U] (“[T]he president cannot obstruct justice when he exercises his lawful 
authority that is vested by Article II of the Constitution.”). We are in full accord with Professors 
Dershowitz and Blackman on this point. Our argument is that Article II does not authorize the president 
to use his position and powers to advance purely personal, pecuniary, or partisan interests. Insofar as the 
president acts on the basis of a good faith (if misguided) conception of his constitutional responsibilities, 
then we, like Professors Dershowitz and Blackman, believe that the president would not be liable under 
the obstruction statutes. We understand Professor Blackman’s views to be largely in harmony with ours, 
though we disagree on whether obstruction by the president for purely partisan ends can be criminal. 
See Josh Blackman, Obstruction of Justice and the Presidency: Part III, LAWFARE (Dec. 18, 2017, 9:00 
AM), https://lawfareblog.com/obstruction-justice-and-presidency-part-iii [https://perma.cc/MT8N-
ZE5M] (noting our divergence on this point). 
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opponent on the eve of an election when the facts do not support those charges, 
as was suggested (but not proven) in the Iglesias case.187 
We would define “personal,” “pecuniary,” and “partisan” interests 
narrowly. The president would be guilty of obstruction if he significantly 
interferes with an investigation because he believes that it will likely bring to 
light evidence of criminal activity or other wrongful or embarrassing conduct by 
himself, his family members, or his top aides. This would not require proof of 
any underlying offense or misdeed. As we have emphasized above, one can 
obstruct an investigation that is headed toward a dead end.188 At the same time, 
a president who interferes with an investigation because he knows there is no fire 
underneath the smoke might justify his intervention on the grounds that the probe 
was a waste of law enforcement resources. 
Family members, in our view, should include first-degree blood relations, 
as is the case under the Justice Department’s recusal rules for federal 
prosecutors.189 Of course, applications will vary case by case. Interfering with 
an investigation in order to protect a son-in-law with whom the president is 
particularly close might constitute obstruction. The Justice Department’s recusal 
regulation is again instructive: it prescribes that “[w]hether relationships 
(including friendships) . . . are ‘personal’ must be judged on an individual basis,” 
with “due regard” for the subjective opinion of the prosecutor whose objectivity 
is under challenge.190 That regulation likewise recognizes that political 
relationships should be judged on a case-by-case basis for conflict of interest 
purposes.191 For example, a president’s national security advisor would almost 
certainly qualify as a top aide to whom our standard would apply, but for many 
others in the White House with more amorphous roles, the determination could 
not be made based on title alone. 
Our standard would apply both where the family member or aide is the 
subject of the investigation, and where the family member or aide is not the 
subject of the investigation but could be embarrassed by the outcome, even if he 
or she never engaged in criminal activity. For example, the president would 
violate the obstruction statutes by blocking an investigation because he thinks it 
might bring to light negative information about a top aide, a family member, or 
the president himself. He would likewise commit obstruction if he blocked an 
investigation of a top aide based on personal friendship toward that individual. 
A more difficult question is presented if the president interferes in an 
investigation because he believes that the target of the probe has served the 
nation admirably and is worthy of mercy. The use of the pardon power under 
 
 187. See supra notes 162–166 and accompanying text. 
 188. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
 189. See 28 C.F.R. § 45.2(c)(2) (2018). 
 190. See id. 
 191. See 28 C.F.R. § 45.2(c)(1) (stating that a prosecutor should recuse herself from an 
investigation of an elected official with whom she has a “close identification . . . arising from service as 
a principal adviser . . . or principal officer”). 
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these circumstances would be proper. As discussed below, however, we do not 
think that the existence of the pardon power justifies the surreptitious obstruction 
of an ongoing inquiry.192 
For cases in which the president orders a subordinate to bring baseless 
charges against a target, we would likewise define the scope of the obstruction 
statutes conservatively. Circumstances that might qualify would include a 
president directing a prosecutor to bring unfounded charges against a political 
opponent in the run-up to an election, or against an estranged spouse in order to 
gain an upper hand in a divorce dispute. Again, the court (or the jury) would need 
to be convinced that the president’s intervention was motivated by personal or 
partisan interests—and not by a good faith, if controversial, view of his 
constitutional responsibilities. 
As for circumstances in which the president’s intervention might amount 
to obstruction because it was motivated by pecuniary interests, our analysis is 
informed by case law construing the federal bribery and extortion statutes.193 
Under those provisions, a president commits a crime if he intervenes in an 
investigation as part of a quid pro quo exchange for a contribution to his 
reelection campaign,194 or—as we discuss below195—a donation to his 
presidential library. Because obstruction for pecuniary purposes overlaps with 
conduct already criminalized by other statutes, our focus here is on 
circumstances in which the president acts for personal or partisan, rather than 
pecuniary, reasons. 
The most difficult questions arise when the president is accused of 
obstructing justice for partisan ends. The president is the leader of his party as 
well as the leader of the country, and it is accepted that he can use the powers of 
his office to advance his party’s interests as well as his own political interest in 
winning reelection or having a member of his party succeed him in office. The 
distinction we seek to make is between actions that are consistent with the ideal 
of political competition and those that are not. The former include actions that 
benefit the president or his party politically because they advance a policy 
agenda of which the public approves. The latter include actions that benefit the 
president or his party by making it difficult for political opponents to make their 
case to the public. 
To understand this distinction, consider three scenarios: (1) a president 
orders the Justice Department to stop prosecuting cases involving possession and 
distribution of marijuana because he considers such efforts to be a poor use of 
scarce enforcement resources; (2) a president orders the Justice Department to 
stop prosecuting cases involving the possession and distribution of marijuana 
 
 192. See infra Part II.B. 
 193. See 18 U.S.C. § 201 (2018) (bribery); 18 U.S.C. § 872 (2018) (extortion); 18 U.S.C. § 1951 
(2018) (Hobbs Act). 
 194. See McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257, 273–74 (1991). 
 195. See infra notes 227–231 and accompanying text. 
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because he believes a “soft on pot” policy will draw younger voters to his party; 
and (3) a president orders the Justice Department to drop a case involving 
possession and distribution of marijuana by a senator from his own party who 
stands for reelection the next month. 
In the first scenario, the president would not be guilty of obstruction. As we 
have argued above, the president’s obligation to “take care that the laws be 
faithfully executed” means that in certain circumstances he must prioritize the 
enforcement of some laws over others, based on policy considerations. 
Moreover, the president’s power over enforcement serves as a check against 
congressional overcriminalization. Thus the president also might, in some cases, 
choose to drop enforcement actions against people who violated a sedition law, 
who evaded the draft, who entered the country illegally, and who failed to pay 
their taxes. Constraints on these types of non-enforcement, if any, would come 
from the constitutional norms discussed above. 
The third scenario is also straightforward: the president acts improperly, 
and thus corruptly, when he uses prosecutorial power to harass his political 
enemies while sparing his friends. Of course, if the president adopted a broad 
policy of prosecutorial forbearance in marijuana possession and distribution 
cases, then applying that broad policy to a partisan ally would not amount to 
obstruction. What the president cannot do is to abuse his position of power to 
distort electoral outcomes by enforcing generally applicable laws only against 
political enemies. 
The second scenario is closer. Let us assume that the president writes a 
memo clearly stating that his only reason for adopting the “soft on pot” policy is 
to win votes—he thinks it is otherwise a bad policy. Imagine that he also 
observes that the policy would throw the opposing party into turmoil, destroying 
its electoral prospects for years to come. Isn’t his motive “narrowly partisan”? 
We think that the president’s motive is legitimate. One can argue (though not all 
would agree) that presidents should adopt policies that the public broadly 
supports, as long as these policies do not exceed constitutional limits.196 What 
the president cannot do is single out targets of law enforcement for harassment 
or immunity based on their partisan leanings. This type of partisan or political 
discrimination undermines political competition by forcing the party out of 
power to devote resources to fend off prosecutions and other enforcement actions 
based on behavior that is no different from that of the president’s supporters—
or, potentially, coerces opponents into silence so that they can avoid the 
president’s wrath. 
Our standard also does not result in criminal liability for the president if the 
president blocks an investigation or prosecution that would have personally 
 
 196. See GARY L. GREGG II, THE PRESIDENTIAL REPUBLIC: EXECUTIVE REPRESENTATION AND 
DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 30 (1997) (describing the “delegate-mandate” model of executive 
representation, which “requires the officeholder to be highly responsive to the . . . wishes of his or her 
constituents”). 
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embarrassed or harmed a prior president of the opposite party. For example, 
President Obama’s decision not to prosecute former Bush administration 
officials for torture197 does not count as obstruction of justice. Obama’s motive 
was, apparently, to avoid criminalizing political differences—an important norm 
in democratic politics. But what if his real motive was to avoid partisan attacks 
that might have jeopardized his legislative priorities and threatened his 
presidency? The decision not to prosecute begins to seem partisan rather than 
public-spirited. While this case is nearer to the line, we think that the obstruction 
statutes would not apply. Here, the president’s concern about partisan 
polarization is close enough to a legitimate conception of the public interest that 
applying the obstruction statutes in such a case would threaten his ability to do 
what he believes is best for the nation. 
Intervening in an investigation to ensure the success of a diplomatic 
endeavor would also not constitute obstruction under our standard. Suppose, for 
example, that the FBI is investigating someone for his possibly illegal financial 
ties to Russia, and it turns out that the president has also retained this person as 
an envoy to conduct sensitive back-channel negotiations. Under our standard, 
the president could order the FBI to drop the case; such an action would be 
consistent with the president’s role as commander in chief and the “organ of the 
nation in its external relations.”198 By contrast, suppose the person is not an 
envoy, but merely a friend or aide, and the president believes that if the 
investigation came to light, he would not be able to obtain the votes for a health 
care reform bill. Here, the national security defense would not hold. Nor could 
the president legitimately defend himself on the ground that the health care 
reform bill was a worthy piece of legislation. Manipulating the conduct of 
criminal investigations in order to sway the outcome of congressional votes is 
flatly inconsistent with the norms of political competition and persuasion that 
undergird a constitutional democracy. 
Our standard does not result in criminal liability for the president if the 
president personally benefits from decisions by lower-level officials, like the 
attorney general and the FBI director, not to prosecute or investigate cases. In 
the absence of an actus reus, there can be no liability.199 
 
 197. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Public Affairs, Statement of Attorney General Eric Holder 
on Closure of Investigation into the Interrogation of Certain Detainees (Aug. 30, 2012), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/statement-attorney-general-eric-holder-closure-investigation-
interrogation-certain-detainees [https://perma.cc/96PX-N8B8]. 
 198. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Co., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936). 
 199. Note that the attorney general and the FBI director also cannot be liable merely for failing 
to bring a case unless some positive act can be identified. Examples of actus reus include ordering an 
end to a probe begun by a subordinate official or destroying documents that might have assisted another 
investigator (such as Congress) with an inquiry into the same matter. Imagine, for example, that the FBI 
director refuses to investigate plausible claims that a family member of the president committed a crime. 
While an argument can be made that officials should be liable for omissions—for failures to comply 
with a positive official duty—we think that such a rule would interfere excessively with prosecutorial 
and enforcement discretion. 
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By contrast, Nixon clearly engaged in obstruction of justice, because he 
interfered with investigations and proceedings that would have put him in legal 
jeopardy and generated embarrassing information without any reason grounded 
in public policy or his constitutional responsibilities for doing so. Nixon’s motive 
was clearly partisan and probably personal as well. The Clinton case is also 
straightforward. Because he interfered with a civil action and a grand jury 
investigation for personal reasons—in order to protect himself from 
embarrassment—he obstructed justice. 
On the other hand, President Reagan and President George W. Bush might 
not be liable for obstruction of justice under our standard. The charge that 
President Reagan committed obstruction in the Iran-Contra affair seems to lack 
an actus reus. If the president had sought to hide evidence from congressional 
investigators regarding US dealings with the Iranians or the Contra rebels, that 
would raise difficult questions about the line between the president’s 
commander-in-chief role and Congress’s foreign affairs powers. The firing of 
US Attorney David Iglesias is close to the line. If the facts are taken in their worst 
light, President Bush or his top aides sought to speed up the prosecution of a 
Democratic politician for partisan reasons. However, merely firing US attorneys 
because they are not loyal to the administration or likely to serve its priorities is 
not obstruction. 
Let us consider some examples taken, in abstract form because of 
ambiguities about the evidence at the time of this writing, from the recent turmoil 
in the Trump administration. First, let’s imagine that a former campaign advisor, 
a retired general, is accused of violating a provision of the Foreign Agents 
Registration Act by failing to disclose certain payments he received from a 
foreign government. Violations of this provision have been prosecuted in the past 
but very rarely lead to prison sentences. The president believes that the retired 
general technically violated the law but that the violation was an oversight that 
resulted from the retired general’s lack of familiarity with the relevant provision. 
The president believes that in light of the retired general’s decades of decorated 
service to the nation, the investigation is unfair and should end. The president 
orders an end to the investigation and threatens to fire the prosecutor pursuing 
the probe unless the prosecutor drops the case. 
This might be a case in which preemptively pardoning the retired general 
would be justifiable on grounds of mercy. (We discuss the pardon power at 
greater length in Part II.B.) But given the close political relationship between the 
president and the retired general, the presumption of regularity would not apply. 
It is, moreover, hard to see how the president’s intervention can be justified on 
grounds of national security, or faithful execution, or the public good more 
generally. Under these circumstances, we think the president’s purpose would be 
improper, and so his interference would amount to obstruction of justice. 
Imagine, now, that the president’s son is accused of violating a provision 
of the Federal Election Campaign Act by accepting an in-kind contribution from 
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a foreign government.200 There is no recorded case of any individual being 
prosecuted successfully for accepting such an in-kind contribution. Lawyers and 
legal scholars are divided as to whether the statute applies to the son’s conduct.201 
A federal prosecutor begins an investigation targeting the son, and the president 
believes that the investigation is motivated by the prosecutor’s own political 
inclinations. The president orders an end to the investigation and threatens to fire 
the prosecutor if he does not drop the probe. This case is closer. The president 
has a responsibility to ensure that lower-level prosecutors do not misuse their 
power for political ends. On the other hand, the president is by no means a 
disinterested party here. He should recuse himself and allow, say, a high-ranking 
official at the Justice Department with a reputation for fair-mindedness to make 
the call. But we think that a court or a jury would likely, and appropriately, 
consider the president’s purpose to be improper because of his personal stake in 
the case and the very loose link to the public interest. 
What if instead the president intervenes in an investigation because he 
knows that it will reveal foreign interference in the last election and so will 
undermine respect for the outcome? The president might argue that popular 
confidence in presidential election results is an overriding national interest. Here, 
too, we think his defense should fail. It is difficult to accept the argument that a 
proper conception of the public interest entails concealing foreign infiltration in 
the American electoral process. Again, the case comes down to mens rea and to 
a judgment, informed by constitutional and prudential considerations, as to 
whether the president’s purpose for intervening in the investigation can possibly 
be characterized as proper. 
In sum, historical examples and imaginative exercises generate easy cases 
as well as hard ones. The president who intervenes in an investigation to cover 
up sexual misconduct commits obstruction. The president who intervenes to hide 
sensitive back-channel communications that might bring peace to the Middle 
East does not violate the obstruction laws. No doubt the future will bring us new 
 
 200. See 52 U.S.C. § 30121(a) (2018) (“It shall be unlawful for . . . a foreign national, directly or 
indirectly, to make . . . a contribution or donation of money or other thing of value . . . in connection 
with a Federal, State, or local election . . . .”). 
 201. Compare Bob Bauer, Campaign Finance Law: When “Collusion” with a Foreign 
Government Becomes a Crime, JUST SECURITY (June 2, 2017), 
https://www.justsecurity.org/41593/hiding-plain-sight-federal-campaign-finance-law-trump-
campaign-collusion-russia-trump [https://perma.cc/Y2FT-38SA] (arguing that “the hacking and 
dissemination of the emails . . . were something of value,” and that 52 U.S.C. § 30121 “and related 
regulations of the FEC separately prohibit any value given by a foreign national”), with Eugene Volokh, 
Opinion, The Strikingly Broad Consequences of the Argument that Donald Trump Jr. Broke the Law by 
Expressing Interest in Russian Dirt on Hillary Clinton, WASH. POST: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (July 14, 
2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/07/14/the-strikingly-
broad-consequences-of-the-argument-that-donald-trump-jr-broke-the-law-by-expressing-interest-in-
russian-dirt-on-hillary-clinton [https://perma.cc/CC3D-H7U5] (“[R]eading ‘thing of value’ to include 
such politically damaging information would outlaw a broad range of constitutionally protected 
opposition research. Such a reading would therefore make [52 U.S.C. § 30121] unconstitutionally 
overbroad . . . .”). 
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data points against which to test our suggested standard. Our purpose is not to 




A. Mixed Motives 
Our analysis in Part I.D assumed a president acting on the basis of a single 
motive. The analysis becomes more complicated when the president’s motives 
are multiple. Imagine that the president intervenes in an investigation both 
because he fears that it will bring to light information that might stymie a 
critically important diplomatic effort and because he fears it will reveal evidence 
that a foreign power meddled in the last election to bolster his own bid. How 
should a court—or how should Congress in the impeachment context—weigh 
the former (legitimate) purpose against the latter (improper) one? We believe 
that a “but-for motive” rule, under which the president is liable only if he would 
not have taken the action without the improper motive, appropriately balances 
the relevant interests.  
Courts that have confronted the mixed motives problem in the context of 
nonpresidential obstruction have generally concluded that the mens rea 
requirement is satisfied “if the offending action was prompted, at least in part, 
by a ‘corrupt’ motive.”202 As one court of appeals has held, “a defendant’s 
unlawful purpose to obstruct justice is not negated by the simultaneous presence 
of another motive for his overall conduct.”203 For example, in one recent case, a 
Philadelphia police officer was assigned to assist in a raid targeting a cocaine 
kingpin whose girlfriend was the sister of a childhood friend. The officer called 
the friend so that the friend could alert his sister of the impending raid. The 
officer was later charged with and convicted of obstruction of justice in violation 
of section 1505.204 The Third Circuit affirmed, emphasizing that “[e]ven if [the 
officer]’s primary motivation was to extricate the sister of his childhood friend 
from a troubled situation, he still could have intended to obstruct the [drug] 
investigation to accomplish this goal.”205 
 
 202. United States v. Howard, 569 F.2d 1331, 1336 n.9 (5th Cir. 1978); accord United States v. 
Brand, 775 F.2d 1460, 1465 (11th Cir. 1985) (“[O]ffending conduct must be prompted, at least in part, 
by a corrupt motive.”) (internal quotation mark omitted); see also United States v. Burke, 125 F.3d 401, 
404 (7th Cir. 1997) (per curiam) (“[D]efendant’s ‘altruistic’ motive . . . does not make it any less an 
obstruction” for purposes of sentencing enhancement); United States v. Fayer, 523 F.2d 661, 663 (2d 
Cir. 1975) (suggesting but not holding that “evidence of a bad motive or purpose . . . is sufficient to 
sustain a conviction even though a good motive is also present”); State v. Maughan, 305 P.3d 1058, 
1062 (Utah 2013) (“[E]ven a mixed motive would still encompass a finding of specific intent to obstruct” 
for purposes of state obstruction of justice statute). 
 203. United States v. Smith, 831 F.3d 1207, 1217 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 204. United States v. Durham, 432 F. App’x 88, 89 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 205. Id. at 92 n.7. 
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Yet it would be unwise to mechanically apply these mixed motives 
precedents to the president. Presidents often act for a mix of personal, partisan, 
and public-spirited reasons. Even when the president believes he is acting for the 
good of the nation, he might also have in mind the thought that his actions will 
raise his approval rating and thus improve his party’s prospects in the next 
election. While we think that the president who obstructs an investigation solely 
for partisan advantage commits the crime of obstruction, it would be absurd to 
say that the president commits the crime of obstruction whenever he exercises 
prosecutorial discretion with partisan politics in the back of his mind. 
We suggest that a “but-for motive” rule makes more sense in the 
presidential obstruction context.206 If the president would have taken the 
challenged action for national security reasons or in executing his responsibility 
to take care that the laws are faithfully executed, then he should not be found 
guilty of obstruction. The application of the obstruction statutes to the president 
should not prevent him from carrying out his constitutional role. However, if the 
president would not have taken the challenged action in the exercise of his 
constitutional functions, then he should not be able to claim Article II immunity 
from obstruction liability. In that case, he should be treated like any other 
defendant, for whom a corrupt motive is enough for criminal liability, even if 
that corrupt motive is not the exclusive rationale for action. 
B. Implications of the Pardon Power 
So far, we have mentioned only in passing the president’s pardon power, 
which further complicates the analysis of presidential obstruction. Article II, 
Section 2, clause 1 of the Constitution gives the president “Power to grant 
Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses against the United States, except in Cases 
of Impeachment.”207 The exception for cases of impeachment likely means, at 
the least, that the president cannot save an official from impeachment by 
pardoning him. It might also mean that the president cannot pardon someone 
who has been impeached and convicted so as to save the ousted officeholder 
 
 206. For a discussion, see Andrew Verstein, The Jurisprudence of Mixed Motives, 127 YALE L.J. 
1106, 1137–38 (2018). 
 207. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. 
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from criminal consequences.208 With this one exception, the president’s pardon 
power is plenary.209 
The existence of the pardon power raises two questions about presidential 
obstruction. The first is whether the president’s exercise of the pardon power can 
ever itself constitute obstruction of justice. The second is whether the president’s 
“greater” power to pardon gives him the “lesser” power to obstruct an 
investigation, as Professor Alan Dershowitz has argued.210 
There is no clear answer to either question, but the relevant legal materials 
suggest that Congress can impeach a president for improper use of the pardon 
power. Alexander Hamilton, whose broad conception of executive power is often 
invoked by advocates of the unitary executive theory,211 said that a president who 
uses the pardon power to shield associates from prosecution for treason could be  
impeached and removed from office.212 The Supreme Court, agreeing with 
 
 208. The best evidence for the latter view comes from a speech by future Supreme Court Justice 
James Iredell at the North Carolina ratifying convention. According to Iredell: 
After trial [in the Senate] thus solemnly conducted, it is not probable that it would happen 
once in a thousand times, that a man actually convicted would be entitled to mercy; and if the 
President had the power of pardoning in such a case, this great check upon high officers of 
state would lose much of its influence. It seems, therefore, proper that the general power of 
pardoning should be abridged in this particular instance. The punishment annexed to this 
conviction on impeachment can only be removal from office, and disqualification to hold 
any place of honor, trust, or profit. But the person convicted is further liable to a trial at 
common law, and may receive such common-law punishment as belongs to a description of 
such offences, if it be punishable by that law. 
3 THE DEBATES, RESOLUTIONS, AND OTHER PROCEEDINGS, IN CONVENTION, ON THE ADOPTION OF 
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 108 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1830). 
 209. As the Supreme Court put it, the pardon power “extends to every offence known to the law, 
and may be exercised at any time after its commission, either before legal proceedings are taken, or 
during their pendency, or after conviction and judgment.” Moreover, the president’s pardon power 
“cannot be fettered by any legislative restrictions.” Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. 333, 380 (1866). 
 210. Alan Dershowitz, History, Precedent, and James Comey’s Opening Statement Show that 
Trump Did Not Obstruct Justice, WASH. EXAMINER (June 8, 2017), 
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president has the constitutional authority to stop the investigation of any person by simply pardoning 
that person.”) 
 211. See Jeremy D. Bailey, The New Unitary Executive and Democratic Theory: The Problem 
of Alexander Hamilton, 102 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 453, 456–58 (2008). 
 212. Hamilton writes: 
A President . . . , though he may even pardon treason, when prosecuted in the ordinary course 
of law, could shelter no offender, in any degree, from the effects of impeachment and 
conviction. Would not the prospect of a total indemnity for all the preliminary steps be a 
greater temptation to undertake and persevere in an enterprise against the public liberty, than 
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incapacitated by his agency in it from affording the desired impunity? 
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Hamilton, suggested in the 1925 case Ex parte Grossman that misuse of the  
pardon power might be an impeachable offense.213 At the state level, Oklahoma 
Governor J. C. Walton was impeached and convicted in 1923 for selling 
pardons.214 Governor Ray Blanton of Tennessee was forced to leave office early 
in 1979 amid similar allegations that his administration sold pardons.215 
But to say that abuse of the pardon power is an impeachable offense is not 
the same as to say it is criminal. Indeed, one could say the opposite: impeachment 
alone provides the remedy for abuse of the pardon power because of worries that 
criminalization would interfere with legitimate uses of executive power. In 
Grossman itself, the Supreme Court declined an opportunity to make an 
exception to the pardon power for criminal contempt of court because of the 
worry that such an exception would interfere with the president’s executive 
discretion. This view is bolstered by a tradition of understanding the pardon 
power in the broadest possible terms, enabling presidents not only to pardon 
people who are unjustly convicted of breaking the law, or who deserve mercy 
because of extenuating circumstances. Numerous presidents have pardoned 
people for broad public policy purposes and even for reasons of narrow political 
expediency, such as to reward political supporters and allies.216 If these types of 
pardons should be regarded as constitutionally proper, then “abuse” of the 
pardon power shrinks down to a very small subset. 
Consider some recent controversies over the pardon power. President Ford, 
who pardoned his predecessor Richard Nixon one month after taking office, 
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justified his decision on the grounds that “the tranquility to which this nation has 
been restored by [Nixon’s resignation] could be irreparably lost by the prospects 
of bringing to trial a former President of the United States.”217 He added that 
Nixon had “already paid the unprecedented penalty of relinquishing the highest 
elective office of the United States.”218 Taking Ford’s words at face value, Ford 
was motivated by the proper purposes of promoting the public welfare and 
granting mercy to a man who had already suffered severe punishment. While at 
the time there were calls for Ford’s impeachment,219 history has judged Ford 
more kindly.220 
History’s judgment has been less generous to President George H.W. 
Bush’s decision to pardon former Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger and 
several other Reagan administration officials for their role in the Iran-Contra 
affair.221 When he granted those pardons on Christmas Eve 1992, less than a 
month before he left office, Bush appealed to considerations of mercy. 
Weinberger was, according to Bush, “a true American patriot” who had 
“rendered long and extraordinary service to our country” over the course of 
several decades, and who was now suffering from a “debilitating” illness while 
also caring for his cancer-stricken wife.222 Bush’s suggestion that he pardoned 
Weinberger and others to prevent “the criminalization of policy differences” 
carried somewhat less force223: the independent counsel who doggedly pursued 
the Iran-Contra investigation was a lifelong Republican and an early supporter 
of Ronald Reagan.224 There was widespread speculation at the time that the true 
motive for the pardons was to stall the independent counsel’s probe into Bush’s 
own wrongdoing—and in particular, to prevent the independent counsel from 
reviewing a diary Bush kept that had recently surfaced.225 Roughly half of 
respondents in a late 1992 Gallup poll said they thought Bush granted the 
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pardons “to protect himself from legal difficulties or embarrassment resulting 
from his own role in Iran-Contra.”226 
On his last day in office in January 2001, President Clinton pardoned the 
fugitive financier Marc Rich, after Rich’s former wife donated $450,000 to 
Clinton’s presidential library.227 The FBI and the US attorney for the Southern 
District of New York later opened an inquiry and empaneled a grand jury to 
consider possible charges of bribery, obstruction, money laundering, and related 
offenses against Clinton.228 The investigation lasted more than two years but did 
not result in an indictment.229 
In an op-ed published a month after the pardon, Clinton gave several 
justifications for his decision, including that other financiers who engaged in 
similar transactions had faced only civil penalties, and that two well-respected 
tax experts had defended Rich’s reporting position.230 Clinton also noted that 
many present and former high-ranking Israeli officials of both major political 
parties and leaders of Jewish communities in America and Europe urged the 
pardon of Mr. Rich because of his contributions and services to Israeli charitable 
causes, to the Mossad’s efforts to rescue and evacuate Jews from hostile 
countries, and to the peace process through sponsorship of education and health 
programs in Gaza and the West Bank.231 This foreign policy rationale might be 
characterized as a claim that “the public welfare will be better served” by the 
granting of the pardons,232 which, if believed, would exonerate President Clinton 
of obstruction (though perhaps not of bribery). 
The investigation into Clinton suggests that, at least as of the early 2000s, 
federal prosecutors and law enforcement officials were not convinced that the 
pardon power gave the president absolute immunity for any exercise of executive 
clemency. How might this view be squared with Ex parte Garland’s expansive 
description of the pardon power?233 The most natural interpretation is that 
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Congress cannot limit the effect of a pardon that has been granted, but that 
criminal law can still apply to the pardon’s grantor. Indeed, we think that it is 
difficult to reject this interpretation unless one believes that a president who sells 
pardons is immune from criminal liability—and we know of no one who 
maintains that view. 
Regardless of whether a president can commit the crime of obstruction by 
granting a pardon, that does not resolve the separate question of whether the 
president’s pardon power immunizes him from criminal liability for interfering 
in an investigation under other circumstances. At least one scholar, Alan 
Dershowitz, argues that the greater power to pardon includes the lesser power to 
drop investigations.234 But while the greater power to pardon does bring some 
lesser powers with it (such as the power to commute a heavier sentence to a 
lighter one235 and the power to remit a fine236), Dershowitz’s claim that the 
pardon power includes the power to block an investigation crumbles under 
scrutiny. 
First, setting aside the issue of whether the president violates the law when 
he grants a pardon for an improper purpose, there remains substantial doubt as 
to whether the president has the power to self-pardon. And if the president lacks 
the “greater” power to self-pardon, then presumably he also lacks the “lesser” 
power to obstruct an investigation of which he is a target. While the text of the 
Constitution does not answer the question of whether the president can self-
pardon,237 the structure of the Constitution arguably suggests that he cannot. As 
noted above, other constitutional provisions appear to reflect a norm against self-
dealing that is baked into the American system of government238—a norm that, 
if applied broadly, would call the validity of self-pardons into question. It was 
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on this ground that the Office of Legal Counsel concluded in the run-up to 
Nixon’s resignation that a president cannot pardon himself.239 
Further evidence against the validity of self-pardons comes from the debate 
at the Constitutional Convention over the pardon clause. After Edmund 
Randolph raised a concern that the president could use the pardon power to shield 
himself from prosecution for treason, James Wilson, a strong proponent of 
executive power, responded: “If [the President] be himself a party to the guilt he 
can be impeached and prosecuted.”240 As Brian Kalt argues, this response 
suggests “an assumption by Wilson that self-pardons were invalid.”241 After all, 
if the president could self-pardon, then Wilson’s assurance that “he can be 
impeached and prosecuted” would have been empty.242 
The strongest argument against the claim that the president’s “greater” 
pardon power includes the power to self-pardon derives from the exception in 
cases of impeachment. If, as suggested above,243 this exception means that a 
pardon is ineffective both as a bar to impeachment and as a bar to criminal 
consequences after impeachment and removal, then the president does not have 
an unfettered power to protect himself from prosecution. To be sure, a self-
pardon in the waning days of a presidential term might shield the outgoing 
president from criminal consequences as a practical matter. But until the 
possibility of impeachment is eliminated, the prospect that the president might 
be held criminally liable for offenses that are also impeachable remains at least 
technically on the table. 
An alternative rebuttal to the “greater includes the lesser” argument posits 
that the power to publicly pardon a suspect is not greater than, but simply 
different from, the power to intervene covertly in an investigation. Professor 
Maxwell Stearns has made this point in response to Dershowitz: a pardon is 
different, according to Stearns, because it is “out [in] the open, subject to media 
scrutiny and challenge,” and thus the president can be “held politically 
accountable.”244 This rebuttal rests on the assumption that pardons are 
necessarily public—an assumption that is not necessarily correct. Chief Justice 
Marshall said in the 1833 case United States v. Wilson that a pardon is a “private, 
though official, act of the executive magistrate, delivered to the individual for 
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whose benefit it is intended, and not communicated officially to the court.”245 
Though Wilson itself did not involve a secret pardon, Marshall’s statement calls 
into question the claim that a pardon necessarily differs from obstruction in its 
publicity. 
And yet still, the distinction between public-facing pardons and 
surreptitious obstruction might serve to undermine the “greater includes the 
lesser” argument here. United States v. Wilson stands for the proposition that a 
pardon negates an indictment, conviction, or sentence only if the defendant 
pleads it in court.246 So even if a pardon can be granted in secret, it does little 
good for the grantee unless he brings it out into the public. Thus, the holding in 
Wilson and the constitutional requirement for public trials in criminal cases247 
arguably ensure that pardons ultimately must be made public if they are to have 
any effect at all. 
In sum, it is possible that the president can avoid criminal liability for 
obstruction of justice by pardoning the target of an investigation rather than by 
ordering subordinates to drop the case. But it is simply not clear that this is the 
case. If, as we think, the president could be convicted of the crime of bribery if 
he pardoned someone in return for a bribe, then we cannot rule out the possibility 
that he could be convicted of obstruction of justice if he pardoned someone to 
block an investigation for reasons untethered to his constitutional and legal 
authority. But even if the president does not commit obstruction of justice in the 
criminal sense through his use of the pardon power, he may commit the crime if 
he orders subordinates to drop investigations or prosecutions. 
C. Can the President Be Indicted for a Crime He Committed While in 
Office? 
The entire question of presidential obstruction of justice might seem idle if 
the president cannot be indicted or convicted of a crime, as some commentators 
have claimed.248 However, there are several reasons why it matters whether the 
president can commit the crime of obstruction of justice. First, it is simply not 
settled law that a president is immune from indictment while in office. Second, 
even if a president cannot be indicted while in office, it may be possible to indict 
and convict him after he leaves office of a crime he committed while in office. 
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Third, even if a president cannot be indicted for a crime committed while in 
office, he may be impeached for such a crime. Below, we briefly discuss each of 
these points. 
The only authoritative legal analysis of the first claim comes from the 
executive branch itself. In 1973, the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) in the Justice 
Department issued an opinion that the president could not be indicted or 
prosecuted while in office.249 Later that year, the solicitor general argued to a 
court in connection with grand jury proceedings against Vice President Spiro 
Agnew that, while the president may be immune from criminal prosecution, the 
lesser impeachable officers were not.250 In 2000, the OLC revisited the question 
and concluded that its earlier opinion was correct.251 
The OLC opinions are open to question. Both opinions were issued from 
the executive branch at a time that it was led by a president who was being 
threatened with impeachment or had recently been impeached.252 And as the 
OLC acknowledges, there is no textual basis for the claim that the president is 
immune from indictment, and little in the way of historical support for that 
claim.253 The Impeachment Judgment Clause says that a party who is impeached 
is also “liable and subject to” the criminal process, implying that an impeached 
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president could be convicted for the crime that led to impeachment.254 Alexander 
Hamilton also expressed this view in the Federalist Papers.255 
By contrast, there is no uncertainty as to whether a former president can be 
convicted of a crime committed while in office. The Impeachment Judgment 
Clause explicitly recognizes that he can, and the OLC agrees.256 There are good 
policy reasons for such a view. The prospect of criminal liability may deter a 
president from breaking the law, while post-tenure proceedings would not 
interfere with presidential duties. This alone justifies our inquiry into whether 
the obstruction of justice statute applies to the president. 
Finally, the question of criminal liability matters because of the role it may 
play in impeachment. The Impeachment Clause says that the president and other 
public officials can be impeached for and convicted of “Treason, Bribery, or 
other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.”257 There are different views about the 
meaning of this clause. The reference to “crimes” may imply that impeachment 
can occur only if the official has committed a crime.258 However, another 
possible view is that a president can be impeached for purely “political” reasons, 
such as losing the confidence of Congress, even if he does not commit a crime.259 
An intermediate view is that Congress can impeach the president only for crimes 
and for political acts that achieve a certain threshold of significance.260 
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Whatever the correct view, we think it important that in both the Nixon and 
Clinton cases, the drafters of the articles of impeachment took care to note in 
some of the articles that the president had committed a “crime.” In both cases, 
articles that did not cite a crime were later dropped.261 At a minimum, some 
members of Congress may not be willing to vote for impeachment or conviction 
unless they can identify a serious underlying crime. For that reason, it is 
important to determine whether a president can commit the crime of obstruction 
of justice. 
D. Canon of Constitutional Avoidance 
We have acknowledged that applying the obstruction statutes to the 
president poses difficult constitutional questions. One might argue that this fact 
alone is sufficient to trigger the canon of constitutional avoidance—the principle 
that “courts should try to interpret statutes so as to avoid raising difficult 
questions of constitutional law.”262 Under this theory, if interpreting the 
obstruction statutes to apply to the president raises difficult constitutional 
questions, then courts should use an alternative interpretation. 
This argument gains support from the Supreme Court’s 1992 decision in 
Franklin v. Massachusetts.263 The Commonwealth of Massachusetts sued 
President George H.W. Bush and two other federal officials, claiming that the 
Bush administration had miscalculated Massachusetts’s population following 
the 1990 census in a way that reduced the state’s delegation to the House of 
Representatives. Massachusetts alleged that the administration’s calculation 
violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA),264 which provides that courts 
“shall . . . hold unlawful and set aside agency action . . . found to 
be . . . arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in 
accordance with law.”265 The Supreme Court rejected Massachusetts’s 
argument, holding that the APA does not apply to the president. As Justice 
O’Connor wrote for the majority: 
The President is not explicitly excluded from the APA’s purview, but 
he is not explicitly included, either. Out of respect for the separation of 
powers and the unique constitutional position of the President, we find 
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that textual silence is not enough to subject the President to the 
provisions of the APA. We would require an express statement by 
Congress before assuming it intended the President’s performance of his 
statutory duties to be reviewed for abuse of discretion.266 
Might the same logic apply to the obstruction laws? After all, the relevant 
statutes do not say explicitly that they reach the president. This argument may 
seem attractive insofar as it would allow a court to avoid—or, at least, delay—
reconciling the obstruction statutes with the principle of presidential 
prosecutorial discretion. The court would in effect be saying that if Congress 
wants the obstruction statutes to apply to the president, it must say so explicitly. 
But we do not think that this argument can carry the day. First, the Supreme 
Court has said that the canon of constitutional avoidance “is a tool for choosing 
between competing plausible interpretations of a provision,” and that the canon 
“has no application in the absence of ambiguity.”267 In Franklin, the relevant 
statute was arguably ambiguous: the term “agency,” while defined expansively 
in the APA,268 is not a word that one usually uses to describe a single individual 
such as the president. Here, by contrast, it is difficult to read “whoever” to mean 
anything other than whoever. Interpreting the word “whoever” to mean 
“whoever, except the president” does violence to the statutory language in a way 
that the canon of constitutional avoidance neither requires nor allows. 
Second, the constitutional avoidance argument sketched out above comes 
into conflict with the holding in United States v. Nixon,269 in which the Supreme 
Court applied Rule 17(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to a sitting 
president. That rule provides, in relevant part, that “[a] subpoena 
may . . . command the person to whom it is directed to produce the books, 
papers, documents or other objects designated therein.”270 Rule 17(c) does not 
explicitly refer to the president as such a person. Notwithstanding the absence of 
any explicit reference to the president, the Justices unanimously concluded that 
the district court acted “consistent[ly] with Rule 17(c)” when it denied President 
Nixon’s motion to quash a subpoena for Oval Office tape recordings.271 And 
while the Supreme Court’s opinion in United States v. Nixon did not mention the 
canon of constitutional avoidance, it is difficult to square that decision with the 
proposition that statutes do not apply to the president unless they specifically say 
so. 
 
 266. See Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 800–01 (1992). The holding in Franklin might 
alternatively be characterized as invoking a clear statement rule for statutory encroachments upon 
presidential power. The choice between these two characterizations seems to us largely semantic. 
 267. Warger v. Shauers, 135 S. Ct. 521, 529 (2014) (alterations and internal quotation marks 
omitted); accord McFadden v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2298, 2307 (2015); Clark v. Suarez Martinez, 
543 U.S. 371, 381 (2005); United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Coop., 532 U.S. 483, 494 (2001). 
 268. See Franklin, 505 U.S. at 800 (citing 5 U.S.C. §§ 701(b)(1), 551(1) (2018)). 
 269. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 702 (1974). 
 270. Id. at 698 (quoting FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(c)). 
 271. Id. at 702. 
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Third, and finally, every member of Congress who addressed the question 
of whether the obstruction laws apply to the president during the Nixon and 
Clinton impeachment proceedings concluded that they do.272 We are not aware 
of any other instance in which any lawmaker has expressed the contrary view. 
Applying the canon of constitutional avoidance would, at most, compel Congress 
to recodify the proposition that the president cannot interfere with the due 
administration of justice—a proposition that senators and representatives have 
accepted for decades without doubt. 
CONCLUSION 
A president commits obstruction of justice when he significantly interferes 
with an investigation, prosecution, or other law enforcement action to advance 
narrowly personal, pecuniary, or partisan interests. This standard helps make 
sense of the pattern of obstruction accusations against presidents since Nixon. 
Of the nine presidents from Nixon to Trump, six of them have faced serious 
accusations of obstruction as a result of their own actions or those of their aides—
Nixon, Reagan, George H.W. Bush, Clinton, George W. Bush, and now Trump. 
In all six of these cases, the trouble can be traced to personal, pecuniary, or 
partisan motives. 
Yet the notion that a president can commit obstruction of justice is a recent 
development. As far as we know, before Nixon, exactly zero of the previous 
thirty-six presidents were placed in legal or political jeopardy because of an 
obstruction of justice allegation. Not even Andrew Johnson was accused of 
obstruction of justice for his failure to enforce Congress’s Reconstruction 
policies, even though the crime of obstruction had been defined by statute for 
more than three decades by that point. What accounts for this significant change 
in public attitudes? 
We speculate that the answer lies in the concurrent expansion of 
presidential power and federal criminal and civil law. Presidents have vastly 
more resources at their disposal to advance their agendas than they did in the 
past, due to the rise in the funding and staffing of the executive branch. Congress 
has also delegated to presidents immense power by passing broad and frequently 
vague laws that regulate many areas of life, including a great deal of political 
behavior (raising money, conducting campaigns, and the like) as well as generic 
laws relating to tax, business, and the like. Laws of both types can ensnare the 
president’s rivals. This means that presidents can strengthen their position in 
government through selective prosecution of their political opponents, along 
with selective non-prosecution of their aides and supporters. Under these 
circumstances, elections cannot exert much discipline on presidents, while the 
impeachment process is cumbersome at best. Courts can normally intervene only 
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at the request of the executive branch, which is controlled by the president. 
Presidents seem unconstrained. 
But it turns out that presidents are vulnerable to an institution that was not 
foreseen by the founders as a check on presidential power: the immense and 
prestigious legal and investigative bureaucracy. Both as a practical matter and as 
a product of post-Watergate concerns about presidential abuse, these powerful 
agencies enjoy considerable political autonomy from the president. These 
institutions can and do, on their own, bring investigations when the president’s 
abuse of power implicates the law, or entangles the president’s aides in legal 
wrongdoing. When these agencies do bring an investigation, the president must 
decide whether to try to block it or permit it. The agencies appear to enjoy enough 
trust among the public that if the president blocks an investigation, he will pay a 
political price. 
All of this suggests that the 186-year-old obstruction of justice law has, in 
the decades since Watergate, evolved into a major check on presidential power. 
This check is often vigorously enforced by law enforcement authorities who are 
nominally under the president’s control but who, as a matter of norms and 
practice, have come to enjoy functional independence. While scholars have for 
a long time pointed out that the executive branch contains “internal checks” that 
may block the president from abusing power,273 the particular form that we have 
identified has attracted little notice. Yet as compared to other internal checks, 
such as the influence of the Justice Department Office of Legal Counsel and of 
the various agency inspectors general, this one—with the threat of criminal 
liability that comes with it—is perhaps the most potent. 
Should we celebrate or bemoan this institutional development? The answer 
is not easy because both theory and historical experience tell us that investigators 
and prosecutors can abuse their power just as the president can. J. Edgar 
Hoover’s abuse of power at the FBI led the Ford administration to exert greater 
control over the agency.274 The perceived abuse of the powers of the independent 
counsel led to its abolition. But the controversies surrounding Trump have 
revived memories of Watergate, which was the impetus for Congress to pass the 
independent counsel statute in the first place. The pendulum may be set to swing 
in the other direction. That may be for the better: the president ought not stand 
above the criminal law. But when laws are vague and law enforcement 
authorities are independent, the risk on the opposite side is that all presidents will 
permanently be under investigation even when they do nothing wrong. Unless 
we think carefully about how criminal law can be harmonized with the 
president’s constitutional responsibilities, we again run the risk that the 
pendulum may swing too far. 
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